Nash equilibrium selection in multi-leader multi-follower games with vertical separation by Ceparano, Maria Carmela

Alla mia famiglia
Contents
Acknowledgement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1 Introduction 3
2 Preliminary tools 9
2.1 Generalized Concave Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.2 Set–Valued Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.3 Parametric Optimization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.4 Stackelberg Games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2.4.1 One–leader one–follower . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.4.2 M–leaders N–followers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3 Some new results in Generalized Convexity Analysis and in
Parametric Optimization 45
3.1 Concavity and isotonicity of the optimal solution function . . 46
3.2 Fixed point theorems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
4 Selection of equilibria for two-stage games with vertical sep-
aration: existence results 53
4.1 Vertical Separation in competitive markets with private con-
tracts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
4.2 General two–stage games with vertical separation . . . . . . . 60
4.3 Existence of Nash Equilibria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
4.4 Equilibria under passive beliefs: definition and existence result 70
4.5 Particular cases: existence results under weaker conditions . . 83
3
4.5.1 In case of uniqueness of the leader’s optimal reaction . 84
4.5.2 In case of nonuniqueness of the leader’s optimal reaction 86
4.5.3 In case of nonuniqueness of the follower’s optimal reaction 93
A Basic Preliminaries 95
A.1 The Euclidean Space Rn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
A.2 On Continuous and Semicontinuous Functions . . . . . . . . . 100
A.3 On Concave Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
4
Acknowledgement
Acknowledgement
At the end of a long, sometimes hard, but always stimulating path, I wish to
thank all the people who have been present, during these last years, showing
me their support and help.
First of all, I am sincerely thankful to my supervisor Professor Morgan
who always encouraged me, gave me tips and valuable advice and always
answered to my innumerable questions, with limitless patience.
I am also grateful to all the professors and specialists of University of
Naples Federico II because they always provided me with explanations and
clarifications, whenever I needed it. Without claiming to list them all, I wish
to thank in particular Professor Pagnozzi, Professor Acconcia and Professor
Graziano for their professionalism and Federico Quartieri because our col-
laboration was critical to the achievement of this work. I thank Professor
Piccolo because he was always ready to help me.
The support of my PhD colleagues, my friends and, most of all, my
family was fundamental to overcome some difficult moments. Their presence
has also given me the tools to better appreciate these years of work and to
find the motivation to continue and complete this path.
1
2
Chapter 1
Introduction
In this thesis a selection concept of Nash equilibria of a two–stage game
with vertical separation and partially observed actions is investigated. The
structure of this game is similar to the structure of a classic multi–leader
multi–follower game, a generalization of the Stackelberg game introduced
in [91] for a duopoly model: the leaders — in the first stage — and the
followers — in the second stage — choose simultaneously an action. So,
two kinds of competition arise in this situation, each in a separate stage:
between the leaders in the first stage and between the followers in the second
stage. The main difference with the classic multi–leader multi–follower game
is that the action chosen by each leader is not observed by all followers. In
particular, it is assumed that the action taken by a leader is observed only
by one follower, that is there is an exclusivity between a single leader and
a single follower. The exclusivity is also embodied in the model assuming
that the action of any leader does not affect the payoffs to other players
but the exclusive follower. These assumptions bring to an extensive form
game without proper subgames and all the previous results for multi–leader
multi–follower games with observed actions are no longer applicable in our
context.
Many real–world situations can be modeled as a two–stage game with
vertical separation and partially observed actions. An example is in games
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of multilateral vertical contracts, as in Pagnozzi and Piccolo [70]: competing
manufacturers (the leaders) delegate retail decisions to exclusive retailers (the
followers), offering a private contract. In this case the two kinds of competi-
tion can be interpreted as interbrand competition among the manufacturers,
who are the producers of a substitute good, and intrabrand competition
among the retailers, who are the dealers of the good to the final consumers.
The action of delegation is known in Industrial Organization literature as ver-
tical separation. Studies on vertical separation in an oligopolistic framework
show that the incentive conflicts derived from a vertical separation between
a manufacturer and external retailers can be used to leaders’ advantage (see,
for example, Bonanno and Vickers [8], Rey and Stiglitz [72], McAfee and
Schwartz [59], Dobson and Waterson [23], Pagnozzi and Piccolo [70]). Fur-
thermore, many papers in the field of multilateral vertical contracting are
interested in the consequences of private contracting between manufactur-
ers and retailers (Rey and Tirole [73], O’Brien and Shaffer [68], McAfee and
Schwartz [59], Caillaud et al. [14], Pagnozzi and Piccolo [70],. . . ). The fact
that the contract is private could represent situations in which commitment
is difficult because of the possibility of private renegotiation or of secret dis-
count, as pointed out in McAfee and Schwartz [59].
In the light of the previous motivations, the thesis generalizes a multi–
leader multi–follower two–stage game that follows the interaction scheme
described previously. This game will be called two–stage game with verti-
cal separation and partially observed actions (or else for short, two–stage
game with vertical separation), in analogy with the industrial organization
literature. Possibly discontinuous payoff functions are considered and it is
assumed that each leader’s payoff function could also depend explicitly on
his exclusive follower’s optimal value function (that is the payoff function of
the follower when he is reacting optimally to any given action of his corre-
sponding leader). This assumption can be viewed as an altruistic/spiteful
behaviour, depending on the way the optimal value function of a follower
affects his leader’s payoff. It is compatible with the fact that if a follower is
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an exclusive retailer of the good produced by the leader, the latter can take
into account the profit of his retailer (possibly in a percentage term) when he
has to decide which strategy to play. Moreover, in engineering applications,
the class of problems that can be modeled in this way are the so–called pa-
rameter design problem and the resource allocation problem for decentralized
systems (Shimizu and Ishizuka [81], Shimizu et al. [82],. . . ).
On the one hand a two–stage game with vertical separation is a particular
type of multi–leader multi–follower problem, on the other hand the partial
unobservability of the actions is a novelty in this type of models and makes
an ineffective refinement the concept of subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
because of the absence of proper subgames. Moreover, the concept of perfect
Bayesian equilibrium could be not useful in that it does not prescribe limi-
tations on the beliefs out of the equilibrium path. So, one way to overcome
multiplicity of equilibria is to restrict attention only to specific beliefs that
each follower has about the strategy chosen by the rival leaders. Taking into
account the specificity of the structure, the case of passive beliefs is consid-
ered, in line with the economic literature from which the model comes from.
Passive beliefs are quite a common assumption mainly in the multilateral
vertical contracting (see Crémer and Riordan [18], Hart et al. [31], O’Brien
and Shaffer [68], McAfee and Schwartz [59], Pagnozzi and Piccolo [70]) but
also in games of electoral competition (see Gavazza and Lizzeri [27]) and
consumer search literature (see Bar-Isaac et al. [3],. . . ), as pointed out in
Eguia et al. [24].
The aim of this thesis is to investigate the existence of equilibria under
passive beliefs of a two–stage game with vertical separation under conditions
of minimal character, mainly when the optimal reaction of any follower is
single–valued. Chapter 4 is entirely devoted to the analysis of these results.
An equilibrium under passive beliefs is proved to correspond to a fixed point
of particular set–valued maps related to the sets of solutions of parametric
Bilevel Optimization problems. Therefore, the existence for an equilibrium
under passive beliefs is guaranteed once the existence of fixed points of the
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considered set–valued map is proved. Given the peculiar structure of such
set–valued maps, the fixed point theorems that fit well in these situations
generally satisfy two main conditions: the closedness of the considered set–
valued maps and the convexity of their values.
Previous results (Loridan and Morgan [50], Morgan [62], Lignola and Morgan
[45]) help to find conditions of minimal character that ensure the closedness
of the set–valued map we examine and the continuity of the optimal value
functions of the followers.
Answer to the second issue requires more effort; also for multi–leader multi–
follower games with observed actions this condition represents a main prob-
lem for both theoretical and computational approaches. Chapter 2 and Chap-
ter 3 are mainly devoted to answer to these questions.
More precisely, Chapter 2 deals with Generalized Concave and Set–Valued
Analysis and related Optimization problems. Besides the notion of quasicon-
cavity, the notion of pseudoconcavity is presented in a generalized version,
for possibly discontinuous functions, in terms of Dini derivatives (see Diew-
ert [21]). Then, some results on the concavity and the generalized concavity
of composite functions are recalled, since a central problem when proving
existence results for multi–leader multi–follower games is to find conditions
that guarantee the quasiconcavity of the leaders’ payoffs which are expressed
as composite functions. Furthermore, basic notions of Set–Valued Analysis,
including semicontinuity and convexity of set–valued maps and their appli-
cations, are recalled. Moreover, properties of the optimal value function and
the so–called optimal solutions set–valued map are emphasized. Finally, a
brief review on the Stackelberg problems is presented, in particular when
any follower’s reaction is single–valued.
In Chapter 3, following Ceparano and Quartieri [16], new results on the
concavity and the isotonicity of an optimal reaction function are proved. The
concavity and isotonicity of the optimal reactions of the followers are used
for proving in Chapter 4 the existence of an equilibrium under passive beliefs
for a special class of two–stage games with vertical separation and partially
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observed actions. Furthermore, a fixed point theorem for set–valued maps,
used in Chapter 4, is proved.
Chapter 4 deals with the analysis of two–stage games with vertical sepa-
ration and partially observed actions. Once the definition of an equilibrium
for such a game is provided and existence of Nash equilibria is obtained for
possibly discontinuous payoff functions, the problem of multiplicity of equi-
libria is illustrated through an example in the context of multilateral vertical
contracting. This motivates the introduction of selections of Nash equilibria
based on the beliefs that each follower has about the action chosen by the
other leaders. So, a solution concept based on passive beliefs is defined when
the optimal reaction of any follower is single–valued and it is shown that
in the above–mentioned example it leads to the selection of a unique Nash
equilibrium.
When the optimal reaction of any follower is a linear function, a first exis-
tence result is given together with sufficient conditions on the data in order
to obtain such property.
With the aim of obtaining existence of equilibria without the condition of
linearity, particular classes of two–stage games with vertical separation are
considered.
First, the optimal reaction of any leader is assumed to be single–valued; ex-
istence is obtained without concavity assumptions.
When the action sets of the followers are subsets of R, existence is proved
assuming concavity of the optimal reaction of any follower and sufficient con-
ditions for the concavity of the optimal reactions are given.
When the action sets of both leaders and followers are subsets of R and the
payoff function of any leader does not depend directly on his own action,
existence is proved assuming the isotonicity of the optimal reaction of any
follower. Sufficient conditions for the isotonicity of the optimal reactions are
provided.
Finally, an existence result is proved when the optimal reaction of any fol-
lower is not single–valued but the payoff function of any leader depends on the
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action of the corresponding follower only through the optimal value function.
In the Appendix basic concepts and results on Euclidean spaces, Real and
Concave Analysis used in the thesis are recalled.
Important properties of the set of the solutions, in particular, closedness
and stability with respect to perturbations on the data, could be also inves-
tigated. These, together with applications to other economic models and the
extension of the results to other types of beliefs, are the purposes of future
studies.
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Chapter 2
Preliminary tools
The scope of this thesis is to give existence results for a selection of Nash
equilibria for a multi–leader multi–follower game with vertical separation.
The precise description of such a game will be given in Chapter 4; here it
is worth mentioning that the definition of a solution for this game involves
parametric Bilevel Optimization problems. Thus, in this chapter we recall
some mathematical tools that fit for the purpose. In particular, in the first
section basic notions and preliminary results on Generalized Concave Anal-
ysis are recalled.
In Section 2.2 basic notions of Set–Valued Analysis, including upper and
lower semicontinuity and their applications, are recalled.
In Section 2.3 some results on the so–called optimal value function and on
the optimal solutions set–valued map are given. In the last section a brief
review of works on leader–follower interactions is presented. In line with the
purpose of this thesis, we mainly report results where the optimal reaction
of any follower is single–valued. This chapter is the starting point for the
analysis of Chapter 3.
The reader is referred to the Appendix for basic notions on Euclidean
spaces and Real and Concave Analysis.
Note that all notions are given in Rn but they would be also valid in a
more general context.
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The material in this chapter is based mainly on Berge [6], Mangasarian
[57], Avriel et al. [2], Aubin and Frankowska [1], Kyparisis and Fiacco [40, 41],
Loridan and Morgan [49, 50], Lignola and Morgan [45, 44, 46], Rockafellar
[75], Cambini and Martein [15], Bazaraa et al. [5].
2.1 Generalized Concave Analysis
Concave functions are very useful for applications in economics, since a local
maximum point for a concave function is also a global one and also since a
point that satisfies the first–order necessary conditions of a concave differen-
tiable function is a global maximum point of the function.
Nonetheless, in many applications it is sufficient to handle with convex
upper level sets, where we recall that an upper level set at height α, with
α ∈ R (also called upper contour set at height α) of a real–valued function
f defined on a set X ⊆ Rn is the set Λα = {x ∈ X : f(x) ≥ α}. The
following notion exploits this property within the field of Generalized Concave
Analysis.
Definition 2.1.1 ([2] Definition 3.1)
Let X be a convex subset of Rn. An (extended) real–valued function f
defined on X is said to be quasiconcave on X if its upper level sets Λα at
height α are convex sets, for any α ∈ R; f is said to be quasiconvex if −f is
quasiconcave.
A very useful characterization of quasiconcavity is given in the next the-
orem.
Theorem 2.1.2 ([2] Theorem 3.1). Let f be a real–valued function defined
on a convex subset X of Rn. Then, f is quasiconcave if and only
f(λx+ (1− λ)y) ≥ min{f(x), f(y)},
for any x, y ∈ X and, for any λ ∈ [0, 1].
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From an application of the definition of quasiconcavity it follows:
Proposition 2.1.3 ([15] Theorem 2.2.4). Let f be a real–valued function
defined on a convex set X ⊆ Rn. Let B be the set of the set of the global
maximum points of f on X, that is B = Argmaxx∈X f(x). If f is quasicon-
cave on X then B is a convex set.
Differently from what happens for concave functions, the sum of qua-
siconcave functions is not necessarily quasiconcave. For example, consider
X = [0,+∞[ and f and g defined by f(x) = −x2 and g(x) = x3 for any
x ∈ X. Both functions are quasiconcave on X but f + g is not quasiconcave
on X. Moreover, even if f is linear and g is quasiconcave the sum is not
necessarily quasiconcave. Consider, for example, f(x) = −x and g(x) = ex.
A function that is both quasiconcave and quasiconvex is said to be quasi-
monotonic.
Remark 2.1.4 As pointed out in [2], for real–valued functions defined on R
the notion of monotonicity and quasimonotonicity are equivalent.
Proposition 2.1.5 ([2] Theorem 3.11). Let f be a differentiable real–valued
function defined on the open convex set X ⊆ Rn. Then f is quasiconcave if
and only if the following implication holds:
x1, x2,∈ X f(x2) ≥ f(x1) implies 〈∇f(x1), (x2 − x1)〉 ≥ 0.
Definition 2.1.6 ([2] Definition 3.8)
A real–valued function f defined on a convex set X ⊆ Rn is said to be strictly
quasiconcave if
f(λx1 + (1− λ)x2) > min{f(x1), f(x2)},
for any x1, x2 ∈ X, with x1 6= x2 and λ ∈]0, 1[; f is said to be strictly
quasiconvex if −f is strictly quasiconcave.
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A (strictly) concave function is also (strictly) quasiconcave. The reverse
is not true. In fact, consider the real–valued function f defined on R by
f(x) = ex: f is (strictly) quasiconcave on R but it is not (strictly) concave
on R.
A strictly quasiconcave function is quasiconcave. In general, the reverse
is not true: a function which is constant over an interval in its domain of
definition is quasiconcave but not strictly quasiconcave. The examples above
can also be used to show that there is not an inclusion relationship between
the class of strictly quasiconcave functions and the class of concave functions.
Definition 2.1.7 ([2] Definition 3.10)
A convex set X ⊆ Rn is said to be strictly convex if for any two points
x1, x2 ∈ X on its boundary and for any λ ∈]0, 1[ the point xλ = λx1+(1−λ)x2
is an interior point of X.
A necessary condition for strict quasiconcavity on Rn is given by the
following definition.
Proposition 2.1.8 ([2] Proposition 3.28). Let f be a continuous function
defined on Rn. If f is strictly quasiconcave then its upper level sets are
strictly convex.
The reverse of the above proposition is not true, as shown in Example 3.3
in [2].
The importance of the strict quasiconcavity in optimization is due to the
following property:
Proposition 2.1.9 ([2] Proposition 3.29). A strictly quasiconcave function
f defined on the convex set X ⊆ Rn attains its maximum on X at no more
than one point.
Another notion related to quasiconcavity is the following:
Definition 2.1.10 ([2] Definition 3.11)
A real–valued function f defined on a convex set X ⊆ Rn is said to be
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semistrictly quasiconcave if
f(x2) > f(x1) implies f(λx1 + (1− λ)x2) > f(x1).
for any x1, x2 ∈ X and any λ ∈]0, 1[; f is said to be semistrictly quasiconvex
if −f is semistrictly quasiconcave.
Note that we use the definition given in Avriel et al. [2]. This definition
differs from the one given by Mangasarian in [57] who calls strict quasicon-
cavity what Avriel calls semistrict quasiconcavity.
A strictly quasiconcave function is characterized by:
f(x2) ≥ f(x1) implies f(λx1 + (1− λ)x2) > f(x1)
for any x1, x2 ∈ and any λ ∈]0, 1[. Then, every strictly quasiconcave function
is semistrictly quasiconcave.
A semistrictly quasiconcave function is not necessarily quasiconcave as
we can easily see in the following example.
Example 2.1.1 Let f be defined on R by:
f(x) =

1 if x 6= 00 if x = 0. (2.1)
This function is semistrictly quasiconcave on R but not quasiconcave on R
and hence f is also not strictly quasiconcave. ⋄
Nevertheless, we have:
Proposition 2.1.11 ( [34] or [2] Proposition 3.30). If f is an upper semi-
continuous semistrictly quasiconcave function on a convex set X ⊆ Rn, then
it is also quasiconcave on X.
If f is upper semicontinuous, semistrict quasiconcavity is stronger than
quasiconcavity, as we can see in the following example.
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Example 2.1.2 Let f be a real–valued function defined on [0, 1] by:
f(x) =

0 if x ∈ [0, 1]x− 1 if x ∈]1, 2].
f is a continuous quasiconcave function but it is not semistrictly quasicon-
cave. ⋄
The semistrict quasiconcavity does not guarantee the uniqueness of the
optimal solution of an optimization problem. Nevertheless, an important
property is expressed in the following proposition.
Proposition 2.1.12 ([2] Theorem 3.37). Let f be a continuous quasiconcave
real–valued function defined on a convex set X ⊆ Rn. Then f is semistrictly
quasiconcave on X if and only if every local maximum point x¯ of f on X is
a global maximum point of f on X.
Another way to generalize the concept of concavity is provided by the
concept of pseudoconcave function.
Definition 2.1.13 ([2] Definition 3.13)
Let f be a differentiable real–valued function defined on an open convex set
X ⊆ Rn. Then f is said to be pseudoconcave on X if:
x1, x2 ∈ X and f(x1) > f(x2) implies 〈∇f(x2), (x1 − x2)〉 > 0; (2.2)
f is said to be strictly pseudoconcave on X if:
x1, x2 ∈ X with x1 6= x2 and f(x1) ≥ f(x2) implies 〈∇f(x2), (x1−x2)〉 > 0;
f is said to be (strictly) pseudoconvex on X if −f is (strictly) pseudoconcave
on X.
A strictly pseudoconcave function is pseudoconcave. The reverse is not
true. Indeed, a constant function is pseudoconcave but not strictly pseudo-
concave.
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Proposition 2.1.14 ([57] Theorem 9.3.5). Let f be a differentiable real–
valued function defined on an open convex set X ⊆ Rn. If f is pseudoconcave
on X then f is semistrictly quasiconcave on X and hence also quasiconcave
on X. The converse is not true.
Proposition 2.1.15 ([15] Theorem 3.2.12). Let f be a differentiable real–
valued function defined on an open convex set X ⊆ Rn. If f is strictly
pseudoconcave on X then f is strictly quasiconcave on X. The converse is
not true.
Then, from Proposition 2.1.9, a strictly pseudoconcave function has at
most one maximum point.
Finally, there is no an inclusion relation between the class of pseudoconcave
functions and the class of strictly quasiconcave functions. Indeed, a constant
function over an open convex subset of Rn is pseudoconcave but not necessar-
ily strictly quasiconcave. Vice versa, if we consider the function f(x) = x3 on
R, f is strictly pseudoconcave but not pseudoconcave (condition (2.2) does
not hold if x2 = 0)[15].
Furthermore, it holds:
Proposition 2.1.16 ([2] Theorem 3.39). Let f be a differentiable real–valued
function defined on an open convex set X ⊆ Rn. If f is (strictly) pseudo-
concave on X and ∇f(x¯) = 0 for some x¯ ∈ X, then x¯ is a (unique) global
maximum point of f on X.
When f is not differentiable, we consider a generalization of pseudocon-
cavity due to Diewert [21] which uses the so–called Dini Derivative.
Let us first recall the definition of Dini derivatives of a function.
Definition 2.1.17 ([22])
Let f be a real–valued function defined on a convex set X ⊆ Rn. Recall that
R = R ∪ {−∞} ∪ {+∞}. The right–hand upper Dini derivative D+f(x, u)
of f at x ∈ X in the direction u ∈ X is defined by:
D+f(x; u) = lim sup
h→0+
f(x+ hu)− f(x)
h
,
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provided that x+ hu ∈ X. Note that D+f(x, u) can be infinite.
Analogously, the right–hand lower Dini derivative of f at x ∈ X in the
direction u ∈ X is:
D+f(x; u) = lim inf
h→0+
f(x+ hu)− f(x)
h
,
provided that x+hu ∈ X; the left–hand upper Dini derivative of f at x ∈ X
in the direction u ∈ X is:
D−f(x; u) = lim sup
h→0−
f(x+ hu)− f(x)
h
,
provided that x+ hu ∈ X; the left-hand lower Dini derivative of f at x ∈ X
in the direction u ∈ X is:
D−f(x; u) = lim inf
h→0−
f(x+ hu)− f(x)
h
provided that x + hu ∈ X, where the lim inf and lim sup are defined as in
(A.5) and (A.6) in the Appendix.
If the function f is defined on X ⊆ R, we indicate the right–hand upper
Dini derivative with D+f(x) = lim suph→0+
f(x+h)−f(x)
h
(without specifying
the direction).
Let X ⊆ R and Y ⊆ Rm be convex sets. If g is a real–valued function
defined onX×Y , we denote withD−g(·, y) the left-hand lower Dini derivative
of the function g(·, y) defined on X, for any y ∈ Y . Therefore
D−g(·, y)(x) = lim inf
h→0−
g(x+ h, y)− g(x, y)
h
. (2.3)
for any y ∈ Y .
A detailed investigation of the Dini derivative with applications to opti-
mization problems can be found in [28]. Let us report a result that will be
useful in the future:
Lemma 2.1.18 ([28] Theorem 1.13). Let f be an upper semicontinuous real–
valued function defined on an interval [a, b] ⊆ R. If D+f(t) ≥ 0 (D+f(t) >
0) for any t ∈ [a, b[ then f is nondecreasing (strictly increasing) on [a, b[.
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Now, we can recall the concept of pseudoconcavity in terms of the Dini
derivative.
Definition 2.1.19 ([21])
A function f defined on a convex set X ⊆ Rn is said to be pseudoconcave in
terms of the upper Dini derivative (in short D–pseudoconcave) if
x, y ∈ X, f(x) < f(y) implies D+f(x; y − x) > 0;
a function is strictly D–pseudoconcave if
x, y ∈ X, f(x) ≤ f(y) implies D+f(x; y − x) > 0;
f is said to be (strictly) D–pseudoconvex if the function g = −f is (strictly)
D–pseudoconcave.
Then, if f is a real–valued function defined on I ⊆ R, f is strictly D–
pseudoconcave if and only if
x, y ∈ I, x < y and f(x) ≤ f(y) implies D
+f(x) > 0
x, y ∈ I, x < y and f(x) ≥ f(y) implies D−f(y) < 0.
(2.4)
A relation between D–pseudoconcavity and quasiconcavity is given in [29].
Recall the following definition.
Definition 2.1.20 ([29])
A real–valued function f defined on a convex set X ⊂ Rn is said to be
radially upper semicontinuous on X (also known as upper semicontinuous on
the segments) if the function φ defined by:
φ(t) = f(tx+ (1− t)y)
is upper semicontinuous on [0, 1], for any x, y ∈ X.
Then, it holds:
17
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Proposition 2.1.21 ([29] Theorem 3.5). Let f be a real–valued function
defined on a convex set X ⊆ Rn. If f is radially upper semicontinuous and
D–pseudoconcave on X, then f is quasiconcave on X.
Other results on connections between the class of quasiconcave functions
and the class of D–pseudoconcave functions can be found in [32].
A strict D–pseudoconcave function has at most one global maximum
point. Indeed, the following proposition holds.
Proposition 2.1.22. Let f be a real–valued strictly D–pseudoconcave func-
tion defined on a convex set X ⊆ Rn. Then, f attains its maximum on X at
no more than one point.
Proof. Let x¯, x¯ ∈ Argmaxx∈X f(x) with x¯ 6= x¯. From the definition of strict
D–pseudoconcavity of f we have
lim sup
t→0+
f(x¯+ t(x¯− x¯))− f(x¯)
t
> 0,
that is, there exists a sequence (tk)k that converges to 0
+ and k¯ ∈ N such
that tk ∈]0, 1[ and
f(x¯+ tk(x¯− x¯))− f(x¯)
tk
> 0, for any k > k¯. (2.5)
From the convexity of X it follows that x¯+ tk(x¯− x¯) ∈ X.
So, f(x¯ + tk(x¯− x¯)) > f(x¯), for some k, in contradiction with the fact that
x¯ is a maximum point of f on X. ⋄
In order to prove existence results for multi–leader multi–follower games,
a central problem is to find conditions that guarantee the quasiconcavity of
leaders’ payoff functions which are expressed as composite functions. Hence,
we conclude the section recalling some results on the concavity and the gen-
eralized concavity of composite functions.
Proposition 2.1.23 ([2] Proposition 2.16). Let φ1, . . . , φm be concave (con-
vex) real–valued functions defined on a convex set X ⊆ Rn and f be a
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concave real–valued componentwise nondecreasing (nonincreasing) function
defined on a concave set Y ⊆ Rm. Assume that Y contains the range of
(φ1, . . . , φm). Then the composite function f˜ = f(φ1, . . . , φm) is concave on
X.
Proof. We prove the concave case, the convex case could be obtained analo-
gously. Let φi be concave onX, for any i = 1, . . . ,m. Then for any x1, x2 ∈ X
and λ ∈]0, 1[ we have
φi(λx1 + (1− λ)x2) ≥ λφi(x1) + (1− λ)φi(x2), (2.6)
for any i = 1, . . . ,m. Since f is concave and componentwise nondecreasing,
using (2.6) we have:
f˜(λx1 + (1− λ)x2) = f(φ1(λx1 + (1− λ)x2), . . . , φm(λx1 + (1− λ)x2))
≥ f(λφ1(x1) + (1− λ)φ1(x2), . . . , λφm(x1) + (1− λ)φm(x2))
≥ λf(φ1(x1), . . . , φm(x1)) + (1− λ)f(φ1(x2), . . . , φm(x2))
= λf˜(x1) + (1− λ)f˜(x2),
that is f˜ is concave on X. ⋄
An analogous result can be proved if f is quasiconcave:
Proposition 2.1.24 ([2] Proposition 5.3). Let φ1, . . . , φm be concave (con-
vex) real–valued functions defined on a convex set X ⊆ Rn and f be a qua-
siconcave real–valued componentwise nondecreasing (nonincreasing) function
defined on a convex set Y ⊆ Rm. Assume that Y contains the range of
(φ1, . . . , φm). Then the composite function f˜ = f(φ1, . . . , φm) is quasicon-
cave on X.
Proof. We prove the concave case, the convex case could be obtained analo-
gously. Let x1, x2 ∈ X and λ ∈]0, 1[. By definition:
φi(λx1 + (1− λ)x2) ≥ λφi(x1) + (1− λ)φi(x2),
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for any i = 1, . . . ,m. If f is componentwise nondecreasing and quasiconcave
we have:
f˜(λx1 + (1− λ)x2) = f(φ1(λx1 + (1− λ)x2), . . . , φm(λx1 + (1− λ)x2))
≥ f(λφ1(x1) + (1− λ)φ1(x2), . . . , λφm(x1) + (1− λ)φm(x2))
≥ min{f(φ1(x1), . . . , φm(x1)), f(φ1(x2), . . . , φm(x2))}
= min{f˜(x1), f˜(x2)},
that is f˜ is quasiconcave on X. ⋄
If m > 1, the previous proposition cannot be weakened assuming some φi
quasiconcave. Indeed, if f is defined on R2 by f(y1, y2) = y1 + y2, we know
that the sum of two quasiconcave functions could be not quasiconcave, as
shown previously.
We can generalize the result in Proposition 2.1.24 when we compose a
quasiconcave function with both concave and convex functions. The proof is
straightforward.
Proposition 2.1.25 ([2] Proposition 5.4). Let φ1, . . . , φm1 be concave real–
valued functions defined on a convex set X ⊆ Rn and ψ1, . . . , ψm2 be convex
real–valued functions defined on X. Let Y be a convex subset of Rm, with
m = m1 +m2. Denote (y1, . . . , yi−1, yi+1, . . . , ym) with y−i and the set {yi ∈
R : (yi, y−i) ∈ Y } with Yy−i. Let f be a quasiconcave real–valued function such
that f(·, y−i) is nondecreasing on Yy−i, for any i = 1, . . . ,m1, and f(·, y−i) is
nonincreasing on Yy−i, for any i = m1 + 1, . . . ,m. Assume that Y contains
the range of (φ1, . . . , φm1 , ψ1, . . . , ψm2).
Then the composite function f˜ = f(φ1, . . . , φm1 , ψ1, . . . , ψm2) is quasiconcave
on X.
When m = 1 in Proposition 2.1.24 we can weaken the hypothesis on both
f and φ.
Proposition 2.1.26 ([2] Proposition 3.2). Let φ be a quasiconcave function
real–valued function defined on a convex set X ⊆ Rn and f be a nondecreasing
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real–valued function defined on a convex set Y ⊆ R. Assume that Y contains
the range of φ. Then, the composite function f˜ = f ◦ φ is quasiconcave on
X.
Proof. Let x1, x2 ∈ X and λ ∈]0, 1[. By definition:
φ(λx1 + (1− λ)x2) ≥ min {φ(x1), φ(x2)}.
If f is nondecreasing on Y we have:
f(φ(λx1 + (1− λ)x2)) ≥ f(min {φ(x1), φ(x2)})
= min {f(φ(x1)), f(φ(x1))},
that is f ◦ φ is quasiconcave on X. ⋄
Finally, we consider the case in which the functions (φi)
m
i=1 are linear.
Proposition 2.1.27. Let X be a subset of Rn and Yi be a convex subset
of Rri, for i = 1, . . . ,m. Let ψi be a linear function from X to Yi, for
i = 1, . . . ,m, and let φi be a concave real–valued function defined on X, for
i = 1, . . . , q. Let Z be a convex subset of Rq and Y =
∏m
i=1 Yi×Z and assume
that Y contains the range of (ψ1, . . . , ψm, φ1, . . . , φq). If f is a quasiconcave
real–valued function on Y and f(ψ1, . . . , ψm, ·, . . . , ·) is componentwise non-
decreasing on Z, then the composite function f˜ = f(ψ1, . . . , ψm, φ1, . . . , φq)
is quasiconcave on X.
Proof. Let x1, x2 ∈ X and λ ∈]0, 1[. Let xλ = λx1 + (1 − λ)x2. Assume
for the sake of simplicity, that m = q = 1. Using the linearity of ψ1, the
quasiconcavity of φ1 and the nondecreasingness of f(ψ1, ·) on Z, we obtain:
f˜(xλ) = f(ψ1(xλ), φ1(xλ)) = f(λψ1(x1) + (1− λψ1(x2)), φ1(xλ))
≥ f(λψ1(x1) + (1− λ)ψ1(x2), λφ1(x1) + (1− λ)φ1(x2))
≥ min{f(ψ1(x1), φ1(x1)), f(ψ1(x2), φ1(x1))},
where the last inequality follows from the quasiconcavity of f . Then f˜ is
quasiconcave. ⋄
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2.2 Set–Valued Analysis
In this section on Set–Valued Maps we recall some notions that have many
applications in theoretical economics.
This section is based, mainly, on Berge [6], Aubin and Frankowska [1],
Ok [69]. In the first part of the section we recall the definitions of limits of
sets as formulated by Painlevé–Kuratowski [39]. The second part is devoted
to basic notions of Set–Valued Analysis.
Let H be a subset of Rn and (Hk)k be a sequence of subsets of R
n.
Definition 2.2.1 ([1] Definition 1.1.1)
The set
Lim sup
k→+∞
Hk = {x ∈ X : lim inf
k→+∞
d(x,Hk) = 0} (2.7)
is said to be the upper limit (in the sense of Kuratowski) of the sequence
(Hk)k, where d(x,H) = infy∈H d(x, y), is the distance from a point x ∈ R
n
to the set H and d is the Euclidean metric.
Equivalently, Lim supk→+∞Hk is the set of cluster points of sequences
(xk)k in (Hk)k, that is:
Lim sup
k→+∞
Hk = {x ∈ X : there exists a sequence (xk)k∈N1 , with N1 ⊆ N
countably infinite, converging to x s.t. xk ∈ Hk for any k ∈ N1}.
Definition 2.2.2 ([1] Definition 1.1.1)
The set
Lim inf
k→+∞
Hk = {x ∈ X : lim
k→+∞
d(x,Hk) = 0} (2.8)
is the lower limit (in the sense of Kuratowski) of the sequence (Hk)k.
Equivalently, Lim infk→+∞Hk is the set of limits of sequences (xk)k in
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(Hk)k, that is:
Lim inf
k→+∞
Hk{x ∈ X : ∃ (xk)k converging to x s.t. xk ∈ Hk for k large}.
(2.9)
So, both the lower and the upper limits are closed sets and Lim infk→+∞Hk ⊆
Lim supk→+∞Kk.
Definition 2.2.3 ([1] Definition 1.1.1)
A subsetH is said to be the limit (in the sense of Kuratowski) of the sequence
(Hk)k if
H = Lim inf
k→+∞
Hk = Lim sup
k→+∞
Hk.
Example 2.2.1 Consider the sequence (Hk)k of subsets of R
2 defined,
for every k in N, by:
Hk =


{
1
k
}
× [−1, 0] if n is odd,{
1
k
}
× [0, 1] if n is even.
Then, Lim infk→+∞Hk = {(0, 0)} and Lim supk→+∞Hk = {0} × [−1, 1]
(see [1]). ⋄
From now on in this section we will denote with X and Y two subsets of
R
n and Rm, respectively.
A set–valued map F : X ⇒ Y , also called correspondence, multifunction, or
point to set map, is a map such that F (x) is a subset of Y , for any x ∈ X.
The set F (x) is called image or value of F at x.
A set–valued map F is strict if all images are not empty. The domain of F
is the set DomF = {x ∈ X : F (x) 6= ∅}.
The image of F is the set ImF =
⋃
x∈X F (x).
For any S ⊆ X, the image of S under F is the set F (S) =
⋃
x∈S F (x).
The graph of F is the set GraphF = {(x, y) ∈ X × Y : y ∈ F (x)}.
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Graph(F )
x
F (x)
Figure 2.1: Graph of set–valued map F .
An example of a set–valued map is in Figure 2.1.
A set–valued map F : X ⇒ Y is said to be closed, or F has the closed
graph property, if GraphF is closed in the product space X × Y , that is if
Lim sup
k→+∞
F (xk) ⊆ F (x),
for any x ∈ X and for any sequence (xk)k converging to x in X.
Analogously, F is said to be open graph if GraphF is open.
The set–valued map F is said to be closed–valued (resp. open–valued) if
F (x) is said to be closed (resp. open) subset of Y , for any x ∈ X; F is said
to be compact–valued if F (x) is compact, for any x ∈ X.
If F is a closed set–valued map, then F is closed–valued; the vice versa
is not always true.
Now, let Z and Y be convex subsets of Rn and Rm, respectively. A set–
valued map F : Z ⇒ T is said to be convex if GraphF is a convex subset
of Rn × Rm, or, equivalently, if for each x, y ∈ Z, and for each λ ∈]0, 1[ we
have:
λF (x) + (1− λ)F (y) ⊆ F (λx+ (1− λ)y).
F is said to be convex–valued if the set F (x) is convex, for any x ∈ Z.
Definition 2.2.4
The set–valued map F : Z ⇒ T is said to be quasiconvex (see [41]) on a
convex set Z ⊆ Rn if F−1(M) is a convex subset of Rn for any convex subset
M of Rm, where F−1(M) = {x ∈ Rm : F (x) ∩M 6= ∅} is the inverse image
of M by F .
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A convex set–valued map is quasiconvex, the converse is not true, as
shown in the following example.
Example 2.2.2 Consider the set–valued map F : Z = [0, 1]⇒ T = [0, 1]
defined for any x ∈ Z by:
F (x) =


{0}, if x ∈ [0, 1
2
[;
[0, 1], if x = 1
2
;
{1}, if x ∈]1
2
, 1];
F is quasiconvex on Z but not convex. ⋄
Each function f from a set X to a set Y can be seen as a particular
set–valued map F from X to Y defined by F (x) = {f(x)}, for any x ∈ X.
On the other hand, if F : X ⇒ Y is single–valued for any x ∈ X, it can be
defined the function f : X → Y such that f(x) ∈ F (x) for any x ∈ X.
Remark 2.2.5 Let us emphasize that, if T is a convex subset of R and F is
a quasiconvex single–valued map then, considered as a function, it is both a
quasiconvex and a quasiconcave function. So, if F , considered as a set–valued
map, is quasiconvex and also single–valued, then, considered as a function,
it is quasimonotone.
The two concepts of semicontinuity for set–valued maps that we will use in
the following were introduced independently by Kuratowski and Bouligand in
1932. Both concepts of semicontinuity for set–valued maps are an extension
of the notion of continuity for functions.
Definition 2.2.6 ([1] Definition 1.4.1)
The set–valued function F is said to be upper semicontinuous at x ∈ DomF
if, for any sequence (xk)k converging to x in X and for any open set O of Y
such that F (x) ⊆ O we have F (xk) ⊆ O for k large.
F is said to be upper semicontinuous if it is upper semicontinuous at x, for
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any x ∈ DomF .
Assume that F is a single–valued map. Then F is upper semicontinuous
on X if and only if, considered as function, it is continuous on X.
Proposition 2.2.7 ([69]). Let F be a set–valued map from X to Y . Assume
that for any sequence (xk)k in X and (yk)k in Y such that yk ∈ F (xk), for all
k ∈ N, there exists a subsequence (yk)k∈N1, with N1 ⊆ N countably infinite,
converging to a point y ∈ F (x). Then F is upper semicontinuous at x ∈ X.
If F is compact–valued, then the converse is also true.
Furthermore, the closed graph property is related, but not equivalent, to
the property of upper semicontinuity.
Example 2.2.3 Consider, for example, the set–valued map:
F (x) =

{0} if x = 0,{ 1
x
} if x > 0.
F is a closed but not an upper semicontinuous set–valued map. ⋄
Graph(F )
Figure 2.2: Graph of a set–valued map F upper semicontinuous which is not
closed.
Conversely, the upper semicontinuity is not sufficient to ensure the closed
graph property. Nevertheless, the relation between closedness and upper
semicontinuity is given in the following proposition.
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Proposition 2.2.8 ([1] Proposition 1.4.8). Assume that F : X ⇒ Y is a
set–valued map. Then the following statements hold:
(i) If F is closed and Y is compact, then F is upper semicontinuous.
(ii) If F is an upper semicontinuous closed–valued map, then F is closed.
Then, if Y is compact and F is closed–valued, we have that F is closed
if and only if F is upper semicontinuous.
Definition 2.2.9 ([1] Definition 1.4.2)
A set–valued map F is lower semicontinuous at x ∈ Dom(F ) if for any
sequence (xk)k converging to x in X we have
F (x) ⊆ Lim inf
k→+∞
F (xk),
that is for any sequence of elements (xk)k in Dom(F ) that converges to x in
X and for any y ∈ F (x), there exists a sequence of elements (yk)k converging
to y such that yk ∈ F (xk) for k large.
F is lower semicontinuous if F is lower semicontinuous at x, for any
x ∈ Dom(F ).
If F is a single–valued map, then F is a lower semicontinuous map if and
only if, considered as function, it is continuous. So, for a single–valued map
the concepts of lower semicontinuity and upper semicontinuity coincide.
This is not longer true for set–valued maps, as we can see in the examples
in Figure 2.3 – 2.4 – 2.5.
Definition 2.2.10 ([1] Definition 1.4.3)
A set–valued map F is continuous at x ∈ X if it is upper and lower semicon-
tinuous at x ∈ X. A set–valued map F is continuous on X if it is continuous
at x ∈ X, for any x ∈ X.
In the following, we recall well–known theorems of Set–Valued Analysis.
The last theorem of the section is the Kakutani’s Theorem, a fixed–point
theorem that has a wide range of applications in economic problems.
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Graph(F )
x
F (x)
Figure 2.3: Graph of
a set–valued map upper
(but not lower) semi–
continuous at x.
Graph(F )
x
F (x)
Figure 2.4: Graph of a
set–valued map lower (but
not upper) semicontinu-
ous at x.
Graph(F )
x
F (x)
Figure 2.5: Graph of a set–valued map neither lower nor upper semicontin-
uous at x.
Proposition 2.2.11 (Border [9] Michael selection Theorem). Let X be a
compact subset of Rn and F : X ⇒ Rm be a lower semicontinuous set–valued
map with closed and convex values. Then, there is a continuous function
f : X → Rm such that f(x) ∈ F (x) for any x ∈ X.
Proposition 2.2.12 ([9] von Neumann’s Approximation Lemma). Let X be
a compact subset of Rn and Y be a convex subset of Rm. Let F : X ⇒ Y
be an upper semicontinuous set–valued map with nonempty compact convex
values. Then, for any ǫ > 0 there exists a continuous function fǫ such that
Graph fǫ ⊆ Uǫ(GraphF ), where Uǫ(GraphF ) = ∪(x,y)∈GraphFB((x, y); ǫ).
Definition 2.2.13
A point x∗ ∈ X is said to be a fixed point on X of a set–valued map
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F : X ⇒ X if x∗ ∈ F (x∗).
Graphically, if X = R, the set of the fixed points of a set–valued map
corresponds to the intersection between the graph of F and the 45◦ line in
the space R2, as in Figure 2.6.
45◦
Graph(F )
Figure 2.6: Set of fixed points of F
Theorem 2.2.14 ([33] Kakutani’s Fixed Point Theorem). Let X be a non-
empty, convex, compact subset of Rn and F : X ⇒ X be a set–valued map.
Let F be convex–valued and closed. Then, there exists at least a fixed point
of F on X.
2.3 Parametric Optimization
Let X and Y be subsets of Rn and Rm, respectively. Let f be a real–valued
function defined on X × Y and F be a set–valued map from X to Y . The
function defined for any x ∈ X by:
v(x) = sup
y∈F (x)
f(x, y) (2.10)
is called optimal value function (or marginal function) and it will play an
important role in Chapter 4. Furthermore, the set–valued map B from X to
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Y defined for any x ∈ X by:
B(x) = Argmax
y∈F (x)
f(x, y), (2.11)
that is called optimal solutions set–valued map, is a very useful concept in an
economic setting. For example, in Game Theory it corresponds to the best
response of a player and the analysis of its properties is central in order to
prove the existence of an equilibrium of a game. In case in which B(x) is a
singleton, for any x ∈ X, we call it optimal solution function (or else optimal
reaction).
Remark 2.3.1 When F is compact–valued and f(x, ·) is upper semicontinu-
ous on Y , for any x ∈ X, we have B(x) 6= ∅ and v(x) = maxy∈F (x) f(x, y).
In the first part of this section let us summarize some properties about the
continuity of the optimal value function. The first result is the well–known
theorem due to Berge that gives also information on the optimal solutions
set–valued map.
Theorem 2.3.2 (Berge’s Theorem (see, for example, Border [9])). Let X
and Y be two subsets of Rn and Rm, respectively. Let F be a compact–
valued map from X to Y and f be a real–valued continuous function defined
on GraphF . If F is continuous at x¯ ∈ X then the optimal value function v
defined in (2.10) is continuous at x¯ and the optimal solutions set–valued map
B defined in (2.11) is nonempty compact–valued and upper semicontinuous
at x¯.
A generalized version of Berge’s Theorem that uses conditions of minimal
character in order to obtain the continuity of v is investigated in Lignola and
Morgan [45]. In the next propositions we we limit ourself to the case in which
the constraint of the optimization problem is constant, that is F (x) = Y for
any x ∈ X. Then, the optimal value function and the optimal solutions
set–valued map are defined for any x ∈ X by:
v¯(x) = sup
y∈Y
f(x, y), (2.12)
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and
B(x) = Argmax
y∈Y
f(x, y). (2.13)
Proposition 2.3.3 ([45] Proposition 3.1.1). Let X and Y be subsets of Rn
and Rm, respectively, and f be a real–valued function defined on X×Y . The
optimal value function v¯ defined in (2.12) is lower semicontinuous at x¯ ∈ X
if and only if for any y ∈ Y and for any sequence (xk)k converging to x¯ in
X there exists a sequence (yk)k such that:
lim inf
k→+∞
f(xk, yk) ≥ f(x¯, y).
Furthermore:
Proposition 2.3.4 ([45] Proposition 4.1.1). Let X and Y be subsets of Rn
and Rm, respectively, and f be a real–valued function defined on X × Y . If
Y is compact and f is upper semicontinuous at (x¯, y), for any y ∈ Y , then
the optimal value function v¯ defined in (2.12) is sequentially upper semicon-
tinuous at x¯.
Furthermore, for the optimal solutions set–valued map we have:
Proposition 2.3.5 (Loridan and Morgan [51] Proposition 4.1). Let X and
Y be subsets of Rn and Rm, respectively, and f be a real–valued function
defined on X × Y . If Y is compact and:
(i) f is upper semicontinuous on X × Y ,
(ii) for any (x, y) ∈ X × Y , for any sequence (xk)k converging to x ∈ X,
there exists a sequence (yk)k in Y such that:
lim inf
k→+∞
f(xk, yk) ≥ f(x, y)
then the optimal solutions set–valued map B defined in (2.13) is closed.
Now, let us recall some results on convexity and concavity of the opti-
mal value function. They are investigated in Kyparisis and Fiacco [40] and
Rockafellar [74], among others.
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Proposition 2.3.6 ([74, 40]). Let X and Y be convex subsets of Rn and Rm,
respectively. If f is real–valued concave function on X ×Y , then the optimal
value function v¯ defined in defined in (2.12) is concave on X.
Proof. It is a well known result. For the sake of completeness we recall the
proof. Let x1, x2 ∈ X such that v¯(xi) > −∞, for i = 1, 2, and λ ∈]0, 1[.
Then
v¯(λx1 + (1− λ)x2) ≥ f(λx1 + (1− λ)x2, y) for any y ∈ Y. (2.14)
Assume, preliminarily, that both v¯(x1) and v¯(x2) are finite.
By definition of supremum, for any ǫ > 0 there exists yi ∈ Y such that
f(xi, yi) > v¯(xi)− ǫ, (2.15)
for i = 1, 2. Then
λf(x1, y1) + (1− λ)f(x2, y2) > λv¯(x1) + (1− λ)v¯(x2)− ǫ.
Thus, let y = λy1 + (1− λ)y2 in (2.14). From the concavity of f we have:
v¯(λx1 + (1− λ)x2) > λv¯(x1) + (1− λ)v¯(x2)− ǫ.
Taking the limit when ǫ goes to 0 we have the thesis.
Assume, now that, for example, v¯(x1) is infinite and v¯(x2) is finite. Then,
also v¯(λx1 + (1 − λ)x2) will be infinite. Indeed, for any M > 0 there exists
y1 ∈ Y such that f(x1, y1) > M and for any ǫ > 0 there exists y2 ∈ Y such
that f(x2, y2) > v¯(x2)−
ǫ
1−λ
. Again, from the concavity of f we have:
v¯(λx1 + (1− λ)x2) > λM + (1− λ)v¯(x2)− ǫ.
Taking the limit for ǫ that goes to 0 and M that goes to +∞, we have
v¯(λx1 + (1− λ)x2) = +∞.
Analogously if both v¯(x1) and v¯(x2) are infinite. ⋄
Proposition 2.3.7 ([40] Proposition 3.5). Let X and Y be convex subset of
R
n and Rm, respectively. If f is a real–valued convex function on X, then
the optimal value function v¯ is convex on X.
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Proof. It follows from Proposition A.3.4 (viii) in the Appendix. ⋄
Let us conclude the section with some results on the quasiconcavity of the
optimal value function and on the quasiconvexity of the optimal solutions
set–valued map that will be used in the Bilevel Optimization problems in
Chapter 4.
Proposition 2.3.8 (Kyparisis and Fiacco [41] Proposition 2.9). Let X and
Y be convex subsets of Rn and Rm, respectively. Let f be a real–valued
function defined on Y and F be a set–valued map from X to Y . If f is upper
semicontinuous and quasiconcave on the set F (X) and F is compact–valued
and quasiconvex on X then the optimal value function v defined in (2.10) is
quasiconcave on X.
Proof. Let α ∈ R and consider the upper level set Λα = {x ∈ X : v(x) ≥ α}.
Let x1, x2 ∈ Λα and λ ∈]0, 1[. Then v(x1) ≥ α and v(x2) ≥ α, that is
maxy∈F (xi) f(y) ≥ α, for i = 1, 2, where we have applied the considerations
in Remark 2.3.1. So, there exists yi ∈ F (xi) such that f(xi) ≥ α, for i =
1, 2. Denoted by [y1, y2] the line segment between y1 and y2, we have that 1
x1, x2 ∈ F
−1([y1, y2]). Therefore, from the quasiconvexity of F , we have that
xλ = λx1+(1−λ)x2 ∈ F
−1([y1, y2]), that is there exists yλ ∈ [y1, y2] such that
yλ ∈ F (xλ). f is quasiconcave on Y , thus f(yλ) ≥ min{f(y1), f(y2)} ≥ α.
Then maxy∈F (xλ) f(y) ≥ α, that is v(xλ) ≥ α and xλ ∈ Λα. ⋄
In the following propositions, results on the optimal solutions set–valued
map are proved when the constraint of the optimization problem F is con-
stant, that is F (x) = Y for any x ∈ X.
Proposition 2.3.9. Let X and Y be convex subsets of R. Assume that
B, the optimal solutions set–valued map from X to Y defined in (2.13), is
nonempty single–valued. If B, considered as a function, is monotone then,
considered as a set–valued map, it is quasiconvex.
Proof. Suppose B(x) = {b(x)}, and assume, without loss of generality, that
b is a nondecreasing function. Let M be a convex subset of Y . Let x1, x2 ∈
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b−1(M), that is b(x1), b(x2) ∈ M . Let λ ∈]0, 1[ and suppose that x1 < x2.
Then λx1+(1−λ)x2 ∈]x1, x2[. So, we have b(λx1+(1−λ)x2) ∈ [b(x1), b(x2)],
that is b(λx1 + (1− λ)x2) ∈M , given the convexity of M . ⋄
Proposition 2.3.10. Let X and Y be convex subsets of Rn and Rm, re-
spectively, and let f be a real–valued function defined on X × Y . Let B be
the optimal solutions set–valued map defined in (2.13) and assume that B is
nonempty–valued. If f is concave on X × Y and f(·, y) is convex on X, for
any y ∈ Y , then B is a convex set–valued map on X.
Proof. Let y1 ∈ B(x1), y2 ∈ B(x2) and λ ∈]0, 1[. From the concavity of f
and from the definition of B(x) we have:
f(λx1 + (1− λ)x2, λy1 + (1− λ)y2) ≥ λf(x1, y1) + (1− λ)f(x2, y2)
≥ λf(x1, y) + (1− λ)f(x2, y) for any y ∈ Y.
That is, from the convexity of f(·, y) on X:
f(λx1 + (1− λ)x2, λy1 + (1− λ)y2) ≥ f(λx1 + (1− λ)x2, y) for any y ∈ Y ;
that is λy1 + (1 − λ)y2 ∈ B(λx1 + (1 − λ)x2) and B is a convex set–valued
map. ⋄
Next corollary follows directly from Proposition 2.3.10.
Corollary 2.3.11. Let X and Y be convex subsets of Rn and Rm, respec-
tively, and let f be a real–valued function defined on X × Y . If f is con-
cave on X × Y , f(·, y) is convex on X, for each y ∈ Y , and the problem
maxy∈Y f(x, y) has a unique solution b(x), for any x ∈ X, then the function
b is linear on X.
2.4 Stackelberg Games
In this section a brief review on Stackelberg games is presented. This kind
of game was introduced by von Stackelberg in [91], where a duopoly model
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was presented: two firms compete in quantities, the one who moves first (the
leader) chooses an action and the other (the follower) replies taking into
account the action of the leader that he observes.
Stackelberg games have been widely examined in literature from many
points of views, in particular in Simaan and Cruz Jr [83], Simaan and Cruz
Jr [84] and Basar and Olsder [4]. For basic introductions, in case of one–
leader one–follower games, see also, for example, Tirole [86], Fudenberg and
Tirole [26], Mas-Colell et al. [58]. In this following subsection, in line with the
scope of the thesis, we consider mainly the case of uniqueness of the optimal
reaction of the follower.
Moreover, although the games we investigate are multi–leader multi–
follower games, results concerning one–leader one–follower games will be
useful for our purpose, as we will see in Chapter 4.
2.4.1 One–leader one–follower
A Stackelberg game is an extensive game between two players: the leader L
and the follower F . Let us denote with X (respectively Y ) the action set
and with l : X × Y → R (resp. f : X × Y → R) the payoff function of L
(resp. F ). A strategy for the follower F is a complete contingent plan that
specifies an action in every possible distinguishable circumstance in which
the follower might be called upon to move. So, given the interaction scheme
explained before, a strategy for F is a function s from X to Y . Let S be the
set of the strategies of the follower, that is S = XY . A classic equilibrium
concept in Game Theory for extensive form games is the concept of subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium (introduced by Selten [78]):
Definition 2.4.1
A couple (x¯, s¯) ∈ X × S is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the Stack-
elberg game presented above if it satisfies the following conditions:
(i) x¯ ∈ Argminx∈X l(x, s¯(x)), i.e. x¯ solves the problem minx∈X f(x, s¯(x));
(ii) s¯(x) ∈ Argminy∈Y f(x, y), for any x ∈ X.
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Basically, in order to find a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, the fol-
lower determines an optimal choice for each situation he might face (that is
for each choice of the leader) and, then, the leader chooses an optimal action
working backward and taking into account the reaction of the follower. Let
us notice that in case there exists at least an action of the leader for which the
follower has more than one optimal reaction, the leader could be not able to
correctly anticipate what action the follower will play. Then, the predictive
power of the Stackelberg model may fall. We briefly discuss this case at the
end of this section.
Now assume in this section, unless otherwise specified, that the follower’s
reaction is single–valued, that is:
(I) for any x ∈ X, the problem miny∈Y f(x, y) has a unique solution.
Then, a Stackelberg problem, also called Bilevel Optimization problem
(see, for example, Morgan [62], Colson et al. [17]), can be formalized as
follows:
S


find x¯ ∈ X that solves minx∈X l(x, s¯(x))
where, for any x ∈ X, s¯(x) is the solution of
P(x) : miny∈Y f(x, y).
(2.16)
The function s¯ is called the reaction function of the follower and the
action x¯ is called Stackelberg solution of S.
Existence of solutions and well-posedness of the Stackelberg problem de-
fined in (2.16) are investigated in [62], where well-posed means that a solu-
tion to the problem S exists, and is unique and any method which constructs
“minimizing sequence” (in some sense to define) automatically allows to ap-
proach a solution ([62, p.307]). Let us report a result that will be used in
Chapter 4.
Proposition 2.4.2 ([62] Corollary 5.1). Under the following assumptions:
(i) X and Y are two sequentially compact spaces;
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(ii) l and f are sequentially lower semicontinuous on X × Y ;
(iii) for any (x, y) ∈ X × Y , for any sequence (xn)n converging to x in X,
there exists a sequence (yn)n in Y such that lim supn→+∞ f(xn, yn) ≤
f(x, y);
there exists a Stackelberg solution to S.
In Loridan and Morgan [49, 50] a general approximation of the Stack-
elberg problem defined in (2.16) by a sequence of Stackelberg problems is
considered. Such a technique, as motivated in [49], is useful for various rea-
sons: on the one hand it offers some results about stability and continuous
dependence of the optimal solutions under perturbations on the data of the
problem; on the other hand it can be used to approximate the problem by
using a sequence of problems that can be easier to solve with respect to the
original problem and that converge to it in some sense. As the authors say,
the main purpose is to give a general framework, for a stability analysis of
Stackelberg problems under data perturbations, using appropriate notions
of convergence (see [50]). They also assume that the follower’s optimization
problem (lower level) has a unique solution.
Starting from the problem defined in (2.16), they consider the following
sequence of Stackelberg problems Sn, for n ∈ N:
Sn


find x¯n ∈ X that solves minx∈X ln(x, s¯n(x))
where, for any x ∈ X, s¯n(x) is the (unique) solution of
Pn(x) : miny∈Y fn(x, y),
(2.17)
where ln and fn are extended real–valued functions defined on X × Y , for
every n ∈ N.
The main results, that will be useful in the next chapters, are summarized
in the next two propositions.
Proposition 2.4.3 ([50] Proposition 3.1). If the two conditions hold:
(i) X and Y are two sequentially compact spaces;
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(ii) for any (x, y) ∈ X×Y , for any sequence ((xn, yn))n converging to (x, y)
in X × Y , we have lim infn→+∞ fn(xn, yn) ≥ f(x, y);
(iii) for any (x, y) ∈ X × Y , for any sequence (xn)n converging to x in X,
there exists a sequence (yn)n in Y such that lim supn→+∞ fn(xn, yn) ≤
f(x, y);
then, for any sequence (xn)n converging to x in X, we have
lim
n→+∞
s¯n(xn) = s¯(x) and lim
n→+∞
fn(xn, s¯n(xn)) = f(x, s¯(x)).
Furthermore, denoted the set {x¯n ∈ X : ln(x¯n, s¯n(x¯n)) = infx∈X ln(x, s¯n(x))}
with Nn and the set {x¯ ∈ X : l(x¯, s¯(x¯)) = infx∈X l(x, s¯(x))} with N , they
prove the following proposition:
Proposition 2.4.4 ([50] Proposition 3.2). Under the assumptions in Propo-
sition 2.4.3 and the following:
(i) for any (x, y) ∈ X×Y , for any sequence ((xn, yn))n converging to (x, y)
in X × Y , we have lim infn→+∞ ln(xn, yn) ≥ l(x, y);
(ii) for any x ∈ X, there exists a sequence (xn)n converging to x in X, such
that, for any y ∈ Y and for any sequence (yn)n converging to y ∈ Y ,
we have lim supn→+∞ ln(xn, yn) ≤ l(x, y);
then lim supNn ⊆ N .
The last result means that each cluster point of a sequence of solutions
to the approximate problems is a solution to problem S.
Let us emphasize that assumptions (ii) and (iii) in Proposition 2.4.3 and
assumptions (i) and (ii) in Proposition 2.4.4 are weaker than continuous
convergence of fn and ln to f and l, respectively, as illustrated in Remark 2.2
in [50].
Other interesting issues about a Stackelberg game concern the descrip-
tion of necessary and sufficient conditions for optimality and algorithms that
solve Bilevel Optimization problems. See, for example, Shimizu and Ishizuka
[81], Vicente and Calamai [88], Luo et al. [54], Dempe [19], Colson et al. [17]
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where bibliographic reviews can be found.
In case of nonuniqueness of the follower’s problem there could be differ-
ent ways to define a “rational” response of the follower. So, different models
can be defined, depending on the way the leader “approaches” the follower’s
problem. In the pessimistic approach the leader is assumed to provide himself
against the possible worst choice of the follower. This approach leads to the
definition of the so–called weak Stackelberg problem also called pessimistic
Bilevel Optimization problem (Leitmann [43], Breton et al. [12], Morgan [62],
Lignola and Morgan [48], Dempe et al. [20],. . . ).
In the optimistic approach the leader is assumed to be able to force the fol-
lower to choose the best strategy for himself. In this case we obtain the
so–called strong Stackelberg problem (Leitmann [43], Breton et al. [12],. . . )
also called optimistic Bilevel Optimization problem, but other models can
be defined such as the so–called intermediate Stackelberg problems (Mallozzi
and Morgan [55], Lignola and Morgan [48],. . . ). Let us emphasize that the
predicted choice for the leader can be different for each different approach,
as illustrated in Morgan and Patrone [63]. Existence of a solution to a weak
Stackelberg problem and continuous dependence on the data could be not
guaranteed, even under very mild assumptions. Strong Stackelberg problem
is easier for what concerns the existence of solutions but it does not display
continuous dependence on the data of the problem. Using approximate so-
lutions to the follower’s problem help to overcome this drawback, even for
more than one follower, as it can be also found in Loridan and Morgan [51,
52], Lignola and Morgan [47, 46], Morgan and Raucci [64, 66, 65], Mallozzi
and Morgan [56].
In Chapter 4 we mainly limit ourself to the case of single–valued followers’
reactions.
2.4.2 M–leaders N–followers
Now, we briefly present some papers on multi–leader multi–follower games.
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Denote with Li, for i = 1, . . . ,M , the leaders and with Fi, for i = 1 . . . , N ,
the followers. Let us denote with Xi the action set of leader Li, for i =
1, . . . ,M , and with Yi the action set of follower Fi, for i = 1, . . . , N . Let
X =
∏M
i=1Xi and Y =
∏N
i=1 Yi and denote with li : X × Y → R the payoff
function of Li, for i = 1, . . . ,M , and with fi : X×Y → R the payoff function
of Fi, for i = 1, . . . , N . A strategy for follower Fi is a function si : X → Yi.
Let Si be the set of the strategies of Fi and let S =
∏N
i=1 Si.
A subgame begins after the choice of any action profile x = (x1 . . . , xM) ∈ X
of the leaders and in any subgame only the followers are involved and play
simultaneously. Let N be the set–valued map from X to Y such that N (x) is
the set of Nash equilibria of the subgame that begins after the action profile
x = (x1, . . . , xM) of the leaders.
Definition 2.4.5
A strategy profile (x¯, s¯) = (x¯1, . . . , x¯M , s¯1, . . . , s¯N) ∈ X × S is a subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium of the multi–leader multi–follower game if it satisfies
the following conditions:
(i) x¯ is a Nash equilibrium of the game Γs¯ = {(Li)
M
i=1; (Xi)
M
i=1; (l
s¯
i )
M
i=1};
(ii) s¯(x) ∈ N (x), for any x ∈ X;
where ls¯i is the function defined by l
s¯
i (x1, . . . , xM) = li(x1, . . . , xM , s¯1, . . . , s¯N),
for any x ∈ X.
As in the case of one follower, the predictive power of the Stackelberg
model may fall if N is not single–valued.
Let us first consider a Stackelberg game in which one leader compete
with N followers. In this simplified model, the leader solves an Optimization
problem.
In oligopolistic models, when the payoff functions of the players corre-
spond to the profits (note that in Definition 2.4.5 we deal with a maximization
problem), a leader can correctly anticipate the reaction of the followers even if
the aggregate reaction R of the followers is single–valued, where R is defined
40
2.4 Stackelberg Games
for any action x of the leader by R(x) = {
∑N
i=1 y¯i : (y¯1, . . . , y¯N) ∈ N (x)}.
In Sherali et al. [80] a model of quantity competition between firms is
investigated: first, the leader announces his output and then the followers,
simultaneously, announce their respective production levels. The existence
and the uniqueness of the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium when the aggre-
gate reaction R is single–valued is proved together with sufficient conditions
on the data in order to obtain such property. Moreover, they investigate the
properties of the aggregate reaction of the Cournot firms and they find an
algorithm to determine such a solution.
An oligopolistic problem where the inverse demand function can be set–
valued is presented in Flåm et al. [25]. A way to face this problem is to take
as market price for every quantity the maximum price compatible with that
quantity. An existence result is given, under appropriate hypotheses on the
inverse demand function.
In Morgan and Raucci [64, 65, 66] existence theorems and convergence
results for games with one leader and two followers are proved, under suffi-
cient conditions of minimal character.
Multi–leader multi–follower games have not been widely investigated in
the literature, maybe for the difficulties that may arise, although they have
many real–world applications (see for example Pang and Fukushima [71]).
A first example of a multi–leader multi–follower game in an oligopolistic
context can be found in Sherali [79], where an extension of the model in [80]
is presented when a few leader–firms supply a homogeneous good noncoop-
eratively. In the paper it is assumed that the actions taken by the leaders are
observable in the lower level by any follower. The authors prove the existence
of an equilibrium, assuming that the aggregate reaction of the followers is
single–valued and, considered as a function, is convex.
In [71] a 2–leader multi–follower noncooperative game is investigated and
it is assumed that the actions taken by the leaders are observable by any
follower. The set–valued map N defined above is not assumed to be single–
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valued and the authors use an optimistic approach:
Definition 2.4.6 ([71])
A strategy profile (x∗1, x
∗
2) ∈ X is said to be a L/F Nash equilibrium if
there exist two action profiles of the followers y∗,1, y∗,2 ∈ N (x∗1, x
∗
2) such that
(x∗1, y
∗,1) is an optimal solution of leader L1’s problem and (x
∗
2, y
∗,2) is an
optimal solution of leader L2’s problem, being the problem of leader Li, for
i = 1, 2, defined by:
min li(xi, x
∗
3−i, y
i)
subject to x1 ∈ Xi
and yi ∈ N (xi, x
∗
3−i).
Then, when N is not single–valued, in the above definition any leader
can have different anticipations of the reaction of the followers. The main
problem is the lack of convexity of the set N (x1, x2). For this reason they
introduce a new class of models, the so–called remedial models, that are
noncooperative multi–leader multi–follower games with convexified strategy
sets. For that convexified multi–leader multi–follower game they show an ex-
istence result. The drawback is that there is not a unique way to convexify.
A remedial model is associated to any different convexification: “The reme-
dial models are not all desirable; while they always have equilibria, a careful
choice of a remedial model leads to a sensible equilibrium solution, whereas
a not-so-careful choice could lead to an equilibrium solution where the lead-
ers have entirely different expectations on the follower’s behavior”. Finally,
applications in oligopolistic competition on the electricity power markets are
considered.
In Kulkarni and Shanbhag [38] there is another recent example of multi–
leader multi–follower interaction, that is formulated similarly to [71]. The
authors also assume that the actions taken by the leaders are observable in
the second stage by any follower. They propose two different approaches
to overcome the problem of the lack of convexity of the lower level prob-
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lem. In the first they introduce a new class of multi–leader multi–follower
games in which the leaders’ payoff functions exhibit a particular structure,
the so–called quasipotential games. The other approach is based on a mod-
ified formulation of the multi–leader multi–follower game in which in the
original problem they add a particular shared constraint. They show that
if the payoff function of any leader admits a potential function, then there
exists an equilibrium of the original game. Then, in both the approaches
they relate the equilibrium of the game to the solution of an appropriate
optimization problem.
When the action of a leader is not observed by all the followers, the
situation is completely different. As we will see in Chapter 4, a problem that
may arise is the multiplicity of Nash equilibria. Unfortunately, the concept of
subgame perfect equilibrium coincides with the concept of Nash equilibrium
since there are no proper subgames. Then, a selection criterion that can be
used is the so–called perfect Bayesian equilibrium(see [26]), that prescribes
beliefs on the information sets of the followers. Unfortunately, such a game
may also have multiple perfect Bayesian equilibria. So, in the literature
particular restrictions on beliefs are considered.
The example of multi–leader multi–follower interaction in multilateral
vertical contracting given in Pagnozzi and Piccolo [70] will provide a moti-
vating example for the analysis in Chapter 4. It will be discussed in more
details in Section 4.1.
Finally, in the very recent working paper Eguia et al. [24] is addressed
the question of the existence of a selection criterion for a multi–leader multi–
follower game in which players in the second stage are imperfectly informed
on the actions played in the first stage. The authors define a new selection
criterion that is tested by experiments in game with multilateral vertical
contracting and in game of electoral competition. The selection used in [24]
is based on the idea that the equilibrium action profile most likely to emerge
is the action profile that can be supported in equilibrium by a larger set
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of different equilibrium beliefs. The criterion, however, does not select the
specific beliefs that accompany these strategy profiles in equilibrium. This
approach differs from the one in Chapter 4 in which we consider, as said, a
perfect Bayesian equilibrium with particular type of beliefs.
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Chapter 3
Some new results in Generalized
Convexity Analysis and in
Parametric Optimization
In this chapter we introduce new results that will be used in Chapter 4 in
order to prove existence theorems for a multi–leader multi–follower game
with vertical separation under passive beliefs. As we will see, one of the
main problems for the existence of this kind of equilibrium is related to the
quasiconcavity of some composite functions. From Proposition 2.1.24, we
know that if we compose a quasiconcave function with m concave functions
we will obtain a quasiconcave function. One of these m functions in the
problem in Chapter 4 is the optimal solution function defined in 2.13. So,
in the first section we give a new concavity result on the optimal solution
function of a parametric optimization problem.
Another interesting problem concerns the isotonicity of the optimal solution
function. This problem is widely studied in the literature and it is related to
the concept of supermodularity of the functions involved in the optimization
problem. For a detailed discussion a reader can be referred, for example,
to Milgrom and Shannon [61], Topkis [87]. The property of isotonicity is
also central in the theory of supermodular games (see, for example, Bulow
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et al. [13], Milgrom and Roberts [60], Vives [89]), where the best responses
exhibit strategic complementarity, i.e. increasing best responses. For these
classes of games existence results are proved using the Tarski Fixed Point
Theorem (Tarski et al. [85]), in a lattice–theoretic context. A new result
that guarantees the isotonicity of the optimal solution function when the
strategy space is a real interval is given in the first section.
Both the announced results are used in Ceparano and Quartieri [16] to prove
uniqueness of Nash equilibrium.
In Section 3.2 we present two generalizations of Cellina Fixed Point Theorem
which will be used in Chapter 4 in order to prove existence of equilibria
under passive beliefs of particular classes of two–stage games with vertical
separation.
3.1 Concavity and isotonicity of the optimal so-
lution function
In this section, following [16], we present new results on concavity and iso-
tonicity of the optimal solutions function.
Let X and Y be nonempty convex subsets of Rn and R, respectively, and
let f be a real–valued function defined on X × Y . We denote with Df the
function from X × int(Y ) to R defined by
Df (x, y) = D−f(x, ·)(y), (3.1)
where, for any x ∈ X, D−f(x, ·) is the left–hand lower Dini derivative of the
function f(x, ·), defined in (2.3).
Theorem 3.1.1. Let X be a nonempty convex subset of Rn and let Y be
a proper compact real interval. Let f be a real–valued function defined on
X×Y . Assume that the function f(x, ·) is upper semicontinuous and strictly
D–pseudoconcave on Y , for any x ∈ X. Let Df be as in (3.1) and b be the op-
timal solutions function from X to Y defined by {b(x)} = Argmaxy∈Y f(x, y),
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for any x ∈ X. Assume that Df is quasiconcave on X × Y . Then, the set
X = {x ∈ X : b(x) > minY } is convex and the function b is concave on X.
Proof. Let us first observe that, from proposition A.2.5 and 2.1.22, f attains
its maximum at a unique point, for any x ∈ X, then b is a function on X.
Suppose that there are t, z ∈ X with t 6= z. Let
ξ = b(t); ζ = b(z).
Then min {ξ, ζ} > minY .
Let λ ∈]0, 1[ and put x = λt+ (1− λ)z. We have to prove that
minY < υ = λξ + (1− λ)ζ ≤ b(x) = υ. (3.2)
If min {ξ, ζ} < maxY , suppose, to the contrary, that
υ < υ.
First of all we have minY ≤ υ < υ < maxY .
From the strict D–pseudoconcavity of f and from the fact that f(x, ·) is
maximized at υ, we have that
D−f(x, ·)(υ) < 0. (3.3)
Furthermore, f(t, ·) is maximized at ξ, that is f(t, ξ) ≥ f(t, y), for any y ∈ Y .
So, for any y < ξ we have that
f(t, y)− f(t, ξ)
y − ξ
≥ 0,
that is
D−f(t, ·)(ξ) ≥ 0; and, analogously D−f(z, ·)(ζ) ≥ 0. (3.4)
Then, from (3.1), we have min{Df (ξ, t),Df (ζ, z)} ≥ 0. Therefore, (ξ, t)
and (ζ, z) belong to the upper level set at height 0 of the quasiconcave func-
tion Df and then also Df (υ¯, x) ≥ 0, that is D−f(x, ·)(υ¯) ≥ 0 in contradiction
with (3.3).
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If min {ξ, ζ} = maxY , that is ξ = ζ = υ = maxY , from the definition of
maximum point and from the strict D–pseudoconcavity of f , we have
D+f(t, ·)(y) > 0, D+f(z, ·)(y) > 0 for all y ∈ int(Y ).
By Lemma 2.1.18 we have that f(t, ·) and f(z, ·) are increasing on int(Y );
then:
D−f(t, ·)(y) ≥ 0; D−f(z, ·)(y) ≥ 0 for all y ∈ int(Y ).
Consequently, by the quasiconcavity of Df on X× int(Y ), we must have that
D−f(x, ·)(y) ≥ 0 for all y ∈ int(Y ). (3.5)
Therefore υ = maxY = υ = b(x) by the strict D–pseudoconcavity of f(x, ·).
Indeed, if υ < maxY from (3.5) we can find some y > υ such that we have
f(x, y) ≤ f(x, υ) and D−f(x, ·)(y) ≥ 0 that is in contradiction with the
definition of a strictly D–pseudoconcave function. ⋄
Corollary 3.1.2. In addition to the assumptions in Theorem 3.1.1, let y =
minY and D+f(x, ·)(y) > 0, for all x ∈ X. Then b is concave on X.
Proof. Let x ∈ X. Directly from the definition, if D+f(x, ·)(y) > 0 there
exists some y > y such that
f(y)− f(y)
y − y
> 0,
which implies that f(y) > f(y). So f cannot attain its maximum in y. ⋄
Now, we will present a result on the isotonicity of the solution of a para-
metric optimization problem. Let us recall the following definition.
Definition 3.1.3 (Gratzer [30])
A real–valued function g defined on a set X ⊆ Rn is called isotone (or
order–preserving) if x ≤X y implies f(x) ≤ f(y), for any x, y ∈ X, where
≤X is the usual partial order relation on X (that is if x = (x1, . . . , xn), y =
(y1, . . . , yn) ∈ X, then x ≤ y if xi ≤ yi, for all i = 1, . . . , n).
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Proposition 3.1.4. Let X be a nonempty subset of Rn and Y be a proper real
interval closed on the left. Let f be a real–valued function defined on X × Y
such that f(x, ·) is upper semicontinuous and strictly D–pseudoconcave on
Y , for every x ∈ X. Defined Df as in (3.1), let Df (·, y) be isotone on X, for
all y ∈ Y . Then, the optimal solutions function b is isotone.
Proof. Take any t and z in X such that t 6= z and ti ≤ zi for all i = 1, . . . ,m.
If b(t) = minY then
b(t) ≤ b(z).
Henceforth suppose b(t) > minY . By the strict D–pseudoconcavity of f in
its second argument (and by the definition of b) we have that
D+f(t, ·)(y) > 0 for all y ∈ [minY, b(t)[,
and consequently, by Lemma 2.1.18, f(t, ·) is increasing on ] minY, b(t)[, that
is:
D−f(t, ·)(y) ≥ 0 for all y ∈]0, b(t)[.
Hence, from the isotonicity of Df (·, y), we have:
D−f(z, ·)(y) ≥ 0 for all y ∈]0, b(t)[. (3.6)
Therefore, (3.6) and the strict D–pseudoconcavity of f in its second argument
imply that
b(t) ≤ b(z).
Indeed, if b(z) < b(t), from (3.6), it follows that D−f(z, ·)(y) ≥ 0 for some
y ∈]b(z), b(t)[ in contradiction with the strict D–pseudoconcavity of f(z, ·)
on int(Y ).
Therefore, b is an isotone function. ⋄
3.2 Fixed point theorems
Let us conclude this chapter proving two fixed point theorems that are a
generalization of the following fixed point theorem.
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Theorem 3.2.1 ([9] Cellina Fixed Point Theorem). Let X be a nonempty
compact convex subset of Rn and Y be a compact convex subset of Rm. Let N
be a set–valued map from X to X and G be a closed set–valued map defined
from X to Y with nonempty compact convex values. Let f be a continuous
function defined on X × Y to X such that for any x ∈ X
N(x) = {f(x, y) : y ∈ G(x)}.
Then, N has a fixed point on X, i.e. there exists x∗ ∈ X satisfying x∗ ∈
N(x∗).
Now, let X ⊆ Rn and Y ⊆ Rm, let G be a set–valued map from X to Y
and F be a set–valued map from X × Y to X. A natural extension of the
Cellina Fixed Point Theorem is to determine when the set–valued map M
from X to X defined by M(x) = ∪y∈G(x)F (x, y) = {x ∈ F (x, y) : y ∈ G(x)}
has a fixed point on X.
Two results have been obtained. The first uses the Michael selection
Theorem (Proposition 2.2.11) but it requires the lower semicontinuity of the
set–valued map F . The second is based on the Von Neumann’s Approxima-
tion Lemma and requires the upper semicontinuity of F .
Theorem 3.2.2. Let X be a nonempty compact convex subset of Rn and Y
be a compact convex subset of Rm. let M be a set–valued map from X to X,
G be a closed set–valued map from X to Y with nonempty compact convex
values and F be a lower semicontinuous set–valued map from X × Y to X
with nonempty closed convex values. Then, the set–valued map on X defined
by:
M(x) = ∪y∈G(x)F (x, y) (3.7)
has a fixed point on X, i.e. there exists x∗ ∈ X satisfying x∗ ∈M(x∗).
Proof. It is a consequence of Theorem 3.2.1 and of the Michael Selection
Theorem (Proposition 2.2.11).
Indeed, if F is lower semicontinuous, there exists a continuous function
f : X×Y → X such that f(x, y) ∈ F (x, y), for any (x, y) ∈ X×Y . Consider
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the set–valued mapM ′(x) = {f(x, y) : y ∈ G(x)}. From Theorem 3.2.1, there
exists a point x∗ ∈ X such that x∗ ∈M ′(x∗), that is x∗ = f(x∗, y) ⊆ F (x∗, y),
for some y ∈ G(x); that is x∗ is a fixed point of M on X. ⋄
A problem with the above theorem arises if one wants to prove existence of
a selection (of Nash equilibria) for a two–stage game under vertical separation
via Theorem 3.2.2. Indeed, an equilibrium of such a game can be stated as
a fixed point of a set–valued map defined as M in (3.7) where F will be the
optimal solutions set–valued map of the lower level problem. In this case,
requiring the lower semicontinuity of F may be a too strong assumption
(see, for example, Loridan and Morgan [53]). Next theorem gives sufficient
conditions easier to verify.
Theorem 3.2.3. Let X be a nonempty compact convex subset of Rn and Y
be a compact convex subset of Rm. Let M be a set–valued map from X to X,
G be a closed set–valued map from X to Y with nonempty compact convex
values and F be a closed set–valued map from X × Y to X with nonempty
convex compact values. Then the set–valued map defined on X by:
M(x) = ∪y∈G(x)F (x, y)
has a fixed point on X, i.e. there exists x∗ ∈ X satisfying x∗ ∈M(x∗).
Proof. From Proposition 2.2.8(i) we have that F is an upper semicontinu-
ous set–valued map. So, from the von Neumann’s Approximation Lemma
(Proposition 2.2.12) for any ǫ > 0 there exists a continuous function fǫ such
that
Graph fǫ ⊆ Uǫ(GraphF ). (3.8)
Consider the set–valued function Mǫ : X ⇒ X defined by:
Mǫ(x) = {fǫ(x, y) : y ∈ G(x)},
for any x ∈ X. From Theorem 3.2.1 Mǫ has a fixed point, for any ǫ > 0.
Consider the sequence (ǫk)k =
(
1
k
)
k
and let x¯k ∈ Mǫk(x¯k), for any k ∈ N.
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Then, there exists y¯k ∈ G(x¯k) such that x¯k = fǫk(x¯k, y¯k) or, equivalently,
(x¯k, y¯k, x¯k) ∈ Graph fǫk , for any k ∈ N. From the compactness of X and
Y , there exists a subsequence (x¯k, y¯k)k∈K1 , with K1 ⊆ N countably infinite,
that converges to (x∗, y∗) in X × Y . So, from the closedness of G, we have
y∗ ∈ G(x∗). We claim that x∗ ∈ F (x∗, y∗).
In fact, from (3.8), for any k ∈ K1 there exists a point (xk, yk, zk) ∈ GraphF
such that d((x¯k, y¯k, x¯k), (xk, yk, zk)) <
1
k
.
Moreover, GraphF ⊆ X × Y ×X is a closed subset of a compact set, that
is GraphF is compact. Hence, there exists a subsequence (xk, yk, zk)k∈K2 ,
with K2 ⊆ K1 countably infinite, and a point (x˜, y˜, z˜) ∈ GraphF such that
(xk, yk, zk) converges to (x˜, y˜, z˜). Using the triangular inequality, for any
k ∈ K2 we have:
d((x¯k, y¯k, x¯k), (x˜, y˜, z˜)) < d((x¯k, y¯k, x¯k), (xk, yk, zk))
+ d((xk, yk, zk), (x˜, y˜, z˜))
<
1
k
+ d((xk, yk, zk), (x˜, y˜, z˜)).
Taking the limit, we have d((x∗, y∗, x∗), (x˜, y˜, z˜)) = 0, being the distance
continuous, that is x∗ = x˜ = z˜ and y∗ = y˜. Thus (x∗, y∗, x∗) ∈ GraphF , so
x∗ ∈M(x∗) and x∗ is a fixed point of M on X.
⋄
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Chapter 4
Selection of equilibria for
two-stage possibly discontinuous
games with vertical separation:
existence results
In this chapter we prove some existence results for a selection of Nash equilib-
ria of a two–stage game with vertical separation. This particular interaction
scheme is inspired by an economic problem, developed by Pagnozzi and Pic-
colo [70], in which two competing manufacturers delegate retail decisions to
independent retailers (such a situation is called vertical separation) and each
producer has to decide a wholesale price (the contract) that their exclusive
retailers have to pay assuming that each retailer sells the good produced by
only one manufacturer. The case in which the contract is private (that is each
retailer observes only the wholesale price chosen by his manufacturer) brings
to an extensive form game without proper subgames. Then, the concept of
subgame perfect equilibrium, that is usually used for two–stage games, do
not allow to select among Nash equilibria (that can be infinitely many). So,
Pagnozzi and Piccolo consider solution concepts depending on conjectures
(or beliefs) that each retailer has about the contract offered to the other re-
53
4. Selection of equilibria for two-stage games with vertical separation: existence results
tailer. Starting from this problem, we analyze in a more general context this
kind of interaction that, by analogy, we will call vertical separation.
First, in Section 4.1 we consider an example of oligopoly with vertical
separation and private contract and we show that the associate normal form
game has an infinite number of Nash equilibria. This motivates the intro-
duction of selections of Nash equilibria based on the beliefs that each retailer
has about the contract offered to the other retailer. We consider the case
of passive beliefs (or market–by–market conjectures) assumed also, for ex-
ample, in Crémer and Riordan [18], Hart et al. [31], McAfee and Schwartz
[59], Laffont and Martimort [42], Gavazza and Lizzeri [27], Bar-Isaac et al.
[3], Pagnozzi and Piccolo [70] and we show that in the example it brings to
the selection of a unique Nash equilibrium. Then, in Section 4.2 we give
the formal definitions of a two–stage game with vertical separation in a gen-
eral context and in Section 4.3 we examine the existence of Nash Equilibria
of this game. In Section 4.4, when the optimal reactions of the followers
are single–valued, we present a solution concept for a general multi–leader
multi–follower game with vertical separation based on passive beliefs which
corresponds to a selection in the set of Nash equilibria. For this solution
concept we prove existence results using conditions of minimal character for
possibly discontinuous functions. A first existence result is given when the
optimal reaction of any follower is a linear function. Conditions on data are
given in order to obtain the linearity of the optimal reactions of the followers.
With the aim of obtaining existence of equilibria without the condition of
linearity, In Section 4.5 we prove existence results for particular classes of
two–stage games with vertical separation, via characterizations of the con-
cept of equilibrium under passive beliefs. More in detail, when the optimal
reaction of the leader is single–valued we prove an existence result without
concavity assumptions.
Another particular class of problem is the one in which the action sets of the
followers are subsets of R. In this case we prove an existence result using
the concavity of the optimal reactions of the followers. Sufficient conditions
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for the concavity of the optimal reactions are given as application of Theo-
rem 3.1.1. Furthermore, if also the action sets of the leaders are subsets of R
and the payoff of the leaders do not depend directly from their actions, we
prove an existence result using the isotonicity of the the optimal reactions of
the followers.
Finally, we consider the case in which the optimal reactions of the followers
are not single–valued and the payoff of any leader depends on the action of
the corresponding follower only through the optimal value function.
4.1 Vertical Separation in competitive markets
with private contracts: an illustrative ex-
ample
First, as in Pagnozzi and Piccolo [70], we consider a delegation problem, in
which two competing manufacturers (the leaders), producers of substitute
goods, choose vertical separation as their organizational structure, that is
the producers delegate the sale of the good they produce through an exclu-
sive retailer. The manufacturers offer a contract to the retailers that decide
in a competitive setting the retail price after observing the contract. The
contract is private so each retailer observes only the contract offered by his
corresponding manufacturer. The situation is modeled as a two–stage game
in the following way:
Stage 1 any manufacturerMi offers a contract ai that specifies the condition
of the delegation to retailer Ri,
Stage 2 all Ri choose, simultaneously, the downstream market price bi.
A strategy for Mi, i = 1, 2, specifies the contract ai that is offered to retailer
Ri. A strategy for Ri corresponds to a downstream market price for every
contract the retailer can observe, that is a function from the space of the
contracts to the set of possible prices. A solution concept considered in [70]
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is based on the fact that, under private contract, the market price chosen by a
retailer depends on his beliefs about the contract offered to the rival retailer.
The authors combine a backward induction framework and the compatibility
with these beliefs in a way that is illustrated forward. In particular, they
considered a kind of beliefs — called passive beliefs — that is plausible in
the context of two competing vertical separate structures.
Passive beliefs, also known as market–by–market conjecture(Hart et al. [31]),
means that if a retailer observes a contract different from the one he expects
in equilibrium then he believes that the rival retailer still observes the cor-
responding equilibrium contract; so, under passive beliefs, each retailer does
not revise his beliefs about the contract offered to the rival retailer, even if
his corresponding manufacturer is deviating. In other words, if a∗i and a
∗
j are
the equilibrium strategies for Mi and Mj, where i, j = 1, 2 and j 6= i, and
if Ri observes a contract different from a
∗
i , then Ri believes that Mj is still
offering the contract a∗j . So, under passive beliefs, a manufacturer’s strategy
does not influence the strategy of the rival retailer nor his conjecture about
these strategies. In order to better illustrate the interest of the model pre-
sented in [70], we formalize now a simplified version.
Suppose that, for i = 1, 2, all manufacturers Mi offer a contract that is the
wholesale price (for unit of good) ai to the corresponding retailer Ri. Let
bi the retail price chosen by retailer Ri. Denoted with Ai (resp. Bi) the
set of the wholesale price (resp. retailer price), we assume Ai = R
+ (resp.
Bi = R
+). For i, j = 1, 2 and i 6= j, denote with Di(bi, bj) the market de-
mand function for the good produced by Mi if the retail price is bi and the
other retailer chooses a price bj. Let the profit functions be given by the
functions:
li(ai, bi, bj) = D
i(bi, bj)ai,
fi(ai, bi, bj) = D
i(bi, bj)(bi − ai).
In order to determine the set of Nash equilibria of the corresponding two–
stage game consider the associate normal form game. Since each leader has
only one information set, each leader’s strategy set is the set Ai. For i = 1, 2,
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the strategy set of the follower Ri is the space Si = A
Bi
i of functions βi from
Ai to Bi (βi : Ai → Bi). Therefore, the strategy profile (a
∗
1, a
∗
2, β
∗
1 , β
∗
2) is a
Nash Equilibrium (Nash et al. [67]) of the two–stage game previously defined
if, for i = 1, 2 and j 6= i:
a∗i ∈ Argmax
ai∈Ai
li(ai, β
∗
i (ai), β
∗
j (a
∗
j)) (4.1a)
β∗i ∈ Argmax
βi∈Si
fi(a
∗
i , βi(a
∗
i ), β
∗
j (a
∗
j)). (4.1b)
Equation (4.1b) can be simplified observing that the only dependence of
the maximizing function from the variable βi is through the value that βi
assumes in a∗i . Denoting
b∗i = β
∗
i (a
∗
i ), for i = 1, 2,
the system in (4.1) is satisfied if:
a∗i ∈ Argmax
ai∈Ai
li(ai, β
∗
i (ai), b
∗
j) (4.2a)
β∗i s.t. b
∗
i ∈ Argmax
bi∈Bi
fi(a
∗
i , bi, b
∗
j). (4.2b)
Consider the special case in which the demand function is linear in both
retail prices (See, for example, Vives [90]) and in particular
Di(bi, bj) = 1− 2bi + bj. (4.3)
Imposing the first order necessary and sufficient conditions (fi(a
∗
i , ·, b
∗
j)
is concave on R+) for the follower Ri, we obtain that b
∗
i has to satisfy the
following variational inequality:
(1 + 2a∗i + b
∗
i − 4b
∗
i )(bi − b
∗
i ) ≤ 0, for any bi ≥ 0. (4.4)
But, b∗i cannot be zero. Indeed, we should have 1 + 2a
∗
i + b
∗
j ≤ 0 in contra-
diction with the fact that Ai = Bj = R
+. So b∗i > 0. Then, (4.4) is satisfied
for any bi ≥ 0 if and only if 1 + 2a
∗
i + b
∗
j − 4b
∗
i = 0, that is b
∗
i =
1
4
+
a∗i
2
+
b∗j
4
.
Therefore, b∗i is given by:
b∗i =
1
3
+
8
15
a∗i +
2
15
a∗j . (4.5)
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• For example, one can verify that the strategy profile given by
sˇ =
(
2
5
,
2
5
, βˇ1, βˇ2
)
s.t. βˇi(ai) =


3
5
if ai =
2
5
,
ν otherwise,
(4.6)
is a Nash equilibrium of the game when ν > 18
25
. Note that βˇi is discon-
tinuous on Ai, i = 1, 2.
In fact:
- the strategies βˇi of Ri, i = 1, 2, satisfy condition (4.5) for a
∗
i = a
∗
j =
2
5
, j 6= i;
- the strategy of Mi, i = 1, 2, satisfies (4.2a), being the payoff of Mi when the
other players play in accordance with sˇ:
lˇi(ai) =


4
25
if ai =
2
5
,(
8
5
− 2ν
)
ai otherwise.
So, a∗i =
2
5
is the unique solution of the problem in (4.2a) if and only if
8
5
− 2ν < 4
25
, that is ν > 18
25
.
• Another Nash equilibria, such that the strategies of all the retailers
are continuous functions in the relative manufacturer strategy, is the
strategy profile:(
2
5
,
2
5
, β˜1, β˜2
)
, s.t. β˜i(ai) =
2
5
+
ai
2
(4.7)
- β˜i solves (4.5) when a
∗
i = a
∗
j =
2
5
, i, j = 1, 2 and j 6= i.
- (4.2a). We have:
l¯i(ai) = li(ai, β˜i(ai), β˜j(
2
5
)) =
4
5
ai − a
2
i
that assumes its maximum value for ai =
2
5
.
As this simple example shows, it is possible that we have an infinity of
equilibria. We cannot refine using the concept of subgame perfect equilibrium
because the two–stage game has no proper subgames. So, we consider a
selection criterion that use the concept of passive beliefs that is a particular
type of perfect Bayesian equilibrium, as we will see in the next section.
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As emphasized in McAfee and Schwartz [59], the concept of passive beliefs
is invoked implicitly or explicitly by many authors (see, for example, Crémer
and Riordan [18], Hart et al. [31], O’Brien and Shaffer [68], McAfee and
Schwartz [59], Laffont and Martimort [42], Gavazza and Lizzeri [27], Bar-
Isaac et al. [3]).
Definition 4.1.1
A strategy profile (a∗1, a
∗
2, β
∗
1 , β
∗
2) is an equilibrium with passive beliefs of the
two–stage game previously defined if
(i) for i, j = 1, 2 and j 6= i, the strategy of Ri is a optimal reaction to
the strategy ai of Mi, assuming that leader Mj always chooses the
equilibrium strategy; that is, for any ai, β
∗
i (ai) is the solution of the
maximization problem:
Argmax
bi∈Bi
fi(ai, bi, b
∗
j). (4.8)
(ii) The strategy a∗i maximizes the payoff function of Mi assuming that Ri
replies in accordance with β∗i and that Mj always chooses the equilib-
rium strategy; that is:
a∗i ∈ Argmax
ai∈Ai
[
li(ai, β
∗
i (ai), b
∗
j)
]
.
Going back to the example, the maximization problem in (4.8) admits a
unique solution β∗i (ai) given by:
βi(ai) =
1
4
+
1
4
b∗j +
1
2
ai, (4.9)
for any ai ∈ Ai. Then, substituting (4.9) into the leader’s problem, we have:
a∗i ∈ Argmax
ai
[(
1
2
+
b∗j
2
)
ai − a
2
1
]
,
that is:
a∗i =
1
4
+
b∗j
4
. (4.10)
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The system: 

a∗1 =
1
4
+
b∗2
4
a∗2 =
1
4
+
b∗1
4
b∗1 =
1
4
+
1
4
b∗2 +
1
2
a∗1
b∗2 =
1
4
+
1
4
b∗1 +
1
2
a∗2.
has a unique solution (a∗1, a
∗
2, b
∗
1, b
∗
2) = (2/5, 2/5, 3/5, 3/5) and the unique
equilibrium with passive beliefs is the strategy profile
(
2
5
,
2
5
, β∗1 , β
∗
2
)
, with β∗i (ai) =
2
5
+
ai
2
, for i = 1, 2. (4.11)
In the previous example, the assumption of passive beliefs allows to refine
the Nash equilibria concept of the two–stage game with continuous action
spaces when the two–stage game has no proper subgame.
4.2 General two–stage games with vertical sep-
aration
First, in order to extend the concept considered in Section 4.1, we define a
general two–stage game Γ with vertical separation in which at any stage a
finite number of agents competes. In the first stage k players, called leaders
Li, i = 1, . . . , k, choose simultaneously an action ai in Ai, nonempty subset
of the finite–dimensional Euclidean space Rni ; in the second stage k players,
called followers Fi i = 1, . . . , k, choose simultaneously an action bi in the set
Bi, nonempty subset of the finite–dimensional Euclidean space R
mi . Let us
denote A =
∏k
i=1Ai and A−i =
∏k
r=1
r 6=i
Ar. An element of A−i is denoted by
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a−i = (a1, . . . , ai−1, ai+1, . . . , ak). Analogously, we adopt the same notations
for the sets associated to the follower’s problem.
In a two–stage game with observed actions at the end of the first stage
any player observes the action chosen by all the leaders. Such games are
also called games of almost–perfect information (see Fudenberg and Tirole
[26]) meaning that there is imperfect information if there are agents that play
simultaneously within a stage. So the followers know all the past history at
the moment they have to play: an action of a follower may depend on the
actions taken by all the leaders. Differently, we will consider a two–stage
game in which the actions taken by any leader is not observable by all the
followers in stage two. First, let us specify the definition of some crucial
concepts.
Definition 4.2.1
A two–stage game is said to be with partially observed actions if the action
chosen by each leader Li is observed only by the corresponding follower Fi,
for i = 1, . . . , k.
So, in the case of partially observed actions, each follower’s choice de-
pends only on the action chosen by his corresponding leader, that is a follower
has as many information sets as the number of actions of his corresponding
leader. Then, a strategy of follower Fi is a function βi from Ai to Bi, that is
βi ∈ Si = (Bi)
Ai . Let S =
∏k
i=1 Si be the set of all (pure) strategy profiles
of the followers.
Definition 4.2.2
A two–stage game is said to be with vertical separation if the action of any
leader Li affects only the payoff of Li and Fi, for i = 1, . . . , k.
Vertical separation expresses the idea that a leader can have an exclusive
follower. So, for the remainder of the chapter we will consider a game with
vertical separation and partially observed action. For sake of brevity, we just
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call it a two–stage game with vertical separation.
Furthermore, we assume that the leaders’ payoff functions can depend
explicitly on the follower optimal value function, that is the optimal payoff
of the follower when he is reacting optimally to any given action of his cor-
responding leader. This can be viewed as an altruistic/spiteful behaviour,
depending on the way the optimal value function of a follower affects his
leader’s payoff. This assumption is compatible with the fact that if a fol-
lower is an exclusive retailer of the good produced by the leader, the latter
can take into account the profit of his retailer (possibly in a percentage term)
when he has to decide about the strategy to play. Moreover, in an engineer-
ing context, the class of problems that can be modeled in this way are the
so–called parameter design problem and the resource allocation problem for
decentralized systems (Shimizu and Ishizuka [81], Shimizu et al. [82]): a cen-
tral system (the leader) decides about the value of a parameter which is
assigned to a subsystem or regional systems (the followers) and optimizes
the central objective function which depends from the value of optimized
subsystems’ performances ([81]).
The objective of each player is to maximize his own payoff function, taking
into account that it depends also on the strategies of the other players. The
payoff function of follower Fi is a real–valued function fi defined on Ai ×B.
Let vi the optimal value function defined of follower Fi defined on Ai × B−i
by:
vi(ai, b−i) = sup
bi∈Bi
fi(ai, bi, b−i) (4.12)
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that vi(ai, b−i) is finite, for any (ai, b−i) ∈
Ai×B−i. For any i = 1, . . . , k, leader Li’s payoff when he plays the action ai ∈
Ai, given an action profile (bi, b−i) of the followers, is li(ai, bi, b−i, vi(ai, b−i)).
Then, the payoff function of leader Li is a function li from the set Ai×B×R
to R.
When each player has only the choice between two actions the game can be
represented by the extensive form given in Figure 4.1.
Now, let (a, β) = (a1, . . . , ak, β1, . . . , βk) ∈ A × S. Denote with β(a) the
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Figure 4.1: Representation of the extensive form game with a finite set of
actions in all the information sets
action profile (β1(a1), . . . , βk(ak)) and denote with β−i(a−i) the action profile
(β1(a1), . . . , βi−1(ai−1), βi+1(ai+1), . . . , βk(ak)). The payoff functions in the
associate normal form game are:
lˆi(a, β) = li(ai, β(a), vi(ai, β−i(a−i))), for leader Li,
fˆi(a, β) = fi(ai, β(a)), for follower Fi,
(4.13)
for i = 1, . . . , k. Let Γ be the normal form of the two–stage game with
vertical separation
Γ = {(Li)i=1,...,k , (Fi)i=1,...,k ; (Ai)i=1,...,k , (Si)i=1,...,k ; (lˆi)i=1,...,k, (fˆi)i=1,...,k}.
(4.14)
Then, applying the well–known concept of Nash equilibrium ([67]) to game
Γ, we have:
Definition 4.2.3
A Nash equilibrium of the game Γ is a 2k-tuple (a∗, β∗) ∈ A × S satisfying,
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for any i = 1, . . . , k, the following inequalities:
lˆi(a
∗, β∗) ≥ lˆi(ai, a
∗
−i, β
∗) for any ai ∈ Ai (4.15a)
fˆi(a
∗, β∗) ≥ fˆi(a
∗, βi, β
∗
−i) for any βi ∈ Si. (4.15b)
Let i = 1, . . . , k. From (4.13), conditions (4.15) are equivalent to
li(a
∗
i , β
∗
i (a
∗
i ), β
∗
−i(a
∗
−i), vi(a
∗
i , β
∗
−i(a
∗
−i))) ≥
li(ai, β
∗
i (ai), β
∗
−i(a
∗
−i), vi(ai, β
∗
−i(a
∗
−i))) for any ai ∈ Ai (4.16a)
and
fi(a
∗
i , β
∗
i (a
∗
i ), β
∗
−i(a
∗
−i)) ≥ fi(a
∗
i , βi(a
∗
i ), β
∗
−i(a
∗
−i)) for any βi ∈ Si;
where the last condition is satisfied if:
fi(a
∗
i , β
∗
i (a
∗
i ), β
∗
−i(a
∗
−i)) ≥ fi(a
∗
i , bi, β
∗
−i(a
∗
−i)) for any bi ∈ Bi. (4.16b)
Conditions (4.16) could generate an infinity of equilibria, provided that an
equilibrium exists. So, let us first give an existence result for a Nash equilib-
rium of the game Γ.
4.3 Existence of Nash Equilibria
Let us observe that the existence of a Nash equilibrium of the game
Γ = {(Li)i=1,...,k , (Fi)i=1,...,k ; (Ai)i=1,...,k , (Si)i=1,...,k ; (lˆi)i=1,...,k, (fˆi)i=1,...,k}
is ensured when there exists an equilibrium of the game
Γ′ = {(Li)i=1,...,k , (Fi)i=1,...,k ; (Ai)i=1,...,k , (Bi)i=1,...,k ; (li)i=1,...,k , (fi)i=1,...,k}.
Indeed, let (a¯, b¯) = (a¯1, . . . , a¯k, b¯1, . . . , b¯k) be a Nash equilibrium of Γ
′ and
let (a¯, β¯) = (a¯1, . . . , a¯k, β¯1, . . . , β¯k) such that β¯i(ai) = b¯i, for any ai ∈ Ai,
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for i = 1, . . . , k. Rewriting conditions (4.16) for (a¯, β¯) we obtain the two
conditions:
li(a¯i, b¯i, b¯−i, vi(a¯i, b¯−i)) ≥ li(ai, b¯i, b¯−i, vi(ai, b¯−i)) for any ai ∈ Ai
fi(a¯i, b¯i, b¯−i) ≥ fi(a¯i, bi, b¯−i) for any bi ∈ Bi,
that are satisfied being (a¯, b¯) a Nash equilibrium of Γ′. Then, (a¯, β¯) is a Nash
equilibrium of Γ.
Sufficient conditions for the existence of an equilibrium of Γ′ are given in
the following theorem.
Theorem 4.3.1. Assume, for i = 1, . . . , k:
(ALi 1) Ai is a nonempty compact convex subset of R
ni;
(ALi 2) li is a real–valued upper semicontinuous function on Ai × B ×R;
(ALi 3) for any (ai, bi, b−i, t) ∈ Ai×B×R, for any sequence ((bi,n, b−i,n, tn))n
converging to (bi, b−i, t) in Bi×B−i×R, there exists a sequence (aˇi,n)n in Ai
such that:
lim inf
n→∞
li(aˇi,n, bi,n, b−i,n, tn) ≥ li(ai, bi, b−i, t);
(ALi 4) li(·, b, ·) is concave on Ai × R for any b ∈ B and li(ai, b, ·) is
nondecreasing on R, for any (ai, b) ∈ Ai × B;
(AFi 1) Bi is a nonempty compact convex subset of a R
mi;
(AFi 2) fi is a real–valued upper semicontinuous function on Ai × B;
(AFi 3) for any (ai, bi, b−i) ∈ Ai × B, for any sequence (ai,n, b−i,n)n con-
verging to (ai, b−i) in Ai × B−i, there exists a sequence (bˆi,n)n in Bi such
that:
lim inf
n→∞
fi(ai,n, bˆi,n, b−i,n) ≥ fi(ai, bi, b−i);
(AFi 4) fi(ai, ·, b−i) is concave, for any (ai, b−i) ∈ Ai × B−i;
Then there exists a Nash equilibrium of Γ′ and, therefore, an equilibrium
of Γ.
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Proof. Let i = 1, . . . , k. Given a strategy profile (a, b), we define the set–
valued map B˜i as the optimal reaction of follower Fi, that is:
B˜i(ai, b−i) = Argmax
bi∈Bi
fi(ai, bi, b−i) (4.17)
for any (ai, b−i) ∈ Ai×B−i and the set–valued map C˜i as the optimal reaction
of leader Li, that is:
C˜i(b) = Argmax
ai∈Ai
li(ai, bi, b−i, vi(ai, b−i))
for any b ∈ B.
• From (AFi 1) and (AFi 2), we have that B˜i is nonempty–valued and the
optimal value function vi is defined on Ai × B−i.
• The optimal reaction of follower Fi is a closed set–valued map as a con-
sequence of Proposition 2.3.5. For the sake of completeness, let us detail
here the proof.
Let (ai, b−i) ∈ Ai × B−i and let ((ai,n, b−i,n))n a sequence converging to
(ai, b−i) in Ai × B−i. Let b¯i ∈ Lim supn→+∞ B˜i(ai,n, b−i,n). Then, there
exists a subsequence (b¯i,n)n∈N1 , with N1 ⊆ N countably infinite, such that
b¯i,n ∈ B˜i(ai,n, b−i,n) for any n ∈ N1 and such that limn→+∞
n∈N1
b¯i,n = b¯i.
We claim that b¯i ∈ B˜i(ai, b−i). Indeed, let bi ∈ Bi. From (AFi 3) we have
that there exists a sequence (bˆi,n)n such that
lim inf
n→+∞
fi(ai,n, bˆi,n, b−i,n) ≥ fi(ai, bi, b−i). (4.18)
Using (AFi 2) with the subsequence
(
b¯i,n
)
n
we have:
lim sup
n→+∞
n∈N1
fi(ai,n, b¯i,n, b−i,n) ≤ fi(ai, b¯i, b−i). (4.19)
Furthermore, from the definition of B˜i we get:
fi(ai,n, b¯i,n, b−i,n) ≥ fi(ai,n, bˆi,n, b−i,n) for any n ∈ N1. (4.20)
Thus, from (4.18)–(4.20) we have fi(ai, bi, b−i) ≤ fi(ai, b¯i, b−i) for all bi ∈
Bi; that is b¯i ∈ Bi.
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• vi is a continuous function on Ai × B−i. It is a consequence of Proposi-
tion 2.3.3– 2.3.4. For the sake of completeness, we report here the proof.
Let (ai, b−i) ∈ Ai×B−i and a sequence ((ai,n, b−i,n))n converging to (ai, b−i)
in Ai × B−i. From the definition of maximum, for any ǫ > 0 there exists
bǫi ∈ Bi such that
fi(ai, b
ǫ
i , b−i) ≥ vi(ai, b−i)− ǫ.
From (AFi 3), there exists a sequence
(
bǫi,n
)
n
in Bi such that
lim inf
n→+∞
fi(ai,n, b
ǫ
i,n, b−i,n) ≥ fi(ai, b
ǫ
i , b−i).
Therefore, using the fact that vi(ai,n, b−i,n) ≥ fi(ai,n, b
ǫ
i,n, b−i,n) for any n ∈
N, we obtain that, for any ǫ > 0, lim infn→+∞ vi(ai,n, b−i,n) ≥ vi(ai, b−i)−ǫ,
that is, taking the limit on ǫ:
lim inf
n→+∞
vi(ai,n, b−i,n) ≥ vi(ai, b−i); (4.21)
that is, the sequence (vi(ai,n, b−i,n))n is bounded from below. Then, there
exists a subsequence (vi(ai,n, b−i,n))n∈N1 such that N1 ⊆ N countably infi-
nite and
lim
n→+∞
n∈N1
vi(ai,n, b−i,n) = v
∗
i ∈ R ∪ {+∞}. (4.22)
From the fact that B˜i is nonempty valued, there exists a sequence (b˜i,n)n∈N1
such that b˜i ∈ B˜i(ai,n, b−i,n), for any n ∈ N1, that is
fi(ai,n, b˜i,n, b−i,n) = vi(ai,n, b−i,n), for any n ∈ N1. (4.23)
From the compactness of Bi there exists a subsequence (b˜i,n)n∈N2 , with
N2 ⊆ N1 countably infinite, such that b˜i,n converges to a point b˜i in Bi.
Hence, b˜i ∈ Lim supn→+∞ B˜i(ai,n, b−i,n) and, from the closedness of B˜i, it
follows that b˜i ∈ B˜i(ai, b−i), that is:
fi(ai, b˜i, b−i) = vi(ai, b−i). (4.24)
Therefore, from (AFi 2), we have
lim sup
n→+∞
n∈N2
fi(ai,n, b˜i,n, b−i,n) ≤ fi(ai, b˜i, b−i)
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that is, using (4.23)–(4.24):
lim sup
n→+∞
n∈N2
vi(ai,n, b−i,n) ≤ vi(ai, b−i).
So, from (4.22), we have
v∗i ≤ vi(ai, b−i),
that is v∗i ∈ R.
Conversely, from (4.22) and the fact that
lim inf
n→+∞
n∈N2
vi(ai,n, b−,n) ≥ lim inf
n→+∞
vi(ai,n, b−,n),
we obtain v∗i ≥ vi(ai, b−i), that is
v∗i = vi(ai, b−i). (4.25)
Condition (4.25) is true for any converging subsequence of (vi(ai,n, b−i,n))n,
then it holds for the entire sequence, that is
lim
n→+∞
vi(ai,n, b−i,n) = vi(ai, b−i)
that is vi is a continuous function.
• B˜i is convex–valued. Indeed, it follows from (AFi 4) and Proposition 2.1.3.
• The function lˇi defined on Ai × B by:
lˇi(ai, bi, b−i) = li(ai, bi, b−i, vi(ai, b−i)), (4.26)
is upper semicontinuous on Ai×Bi×B−i as a consequence of (ALi 2) and
the continuity of vi on Ai × B−i previously proved. So, from (ALi 1), we
deduce that C˜i is nonempty–valued. Furthermore, from the continuity of
vi on Ai × B−i and (ALi 3), we have that for any (ai, b) ∈ Ai × B and for
any sequence (bi,n)n converging to bi there exists a sequence (ai,n)n such
that
lim inf
n→+∞
lˇi(ai,n, bi,n, b−i,n) ≥ lˇi(ai, bi, b−i).
Then, replicating the proof in the first point, we have that C˜i is a closed
set–valued map.
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• C˜i is convex–valued. Indeed, from Theorem 2.3.6 the function vi(·, b−i) is
concave on Ai. Then, from Proposition 2.1.25 we have lˇi quasiconcave on
Ai and, from Proposition 2.1.3, C˜i(b−i) is a convex set.
• Finally, the set–valued map D defined on A× B by
D(a1, . . . , ak, b1, . . . , bk) =
k∏
i=1
Ci(b1 . . . , bk)×
k∏
i=1
B˜i(ai, b−i)
satisfies the hypothesis of Kakutani Fixed Point Theorem (Theorem 2.2.14).
So, there exists a fixed point of D on A× B, that is an equilibrium of Γ′.
⋄
Remark 4.3.2 Let i = 1, . . . , k. If fi is a continuous function, then assump-
tions (AFi 2), (AFi 3) are satisfied. The vice versa is not true, as illustrated
in the following example. The same arguments hold for leaders’ payoff func-
tions.
Example 4.3.1 Let Ai = Bi = [0, 1], for i = 1, 2. Let fi be a real–valued
function defined on [0, 1]3 by:
fi(ai, bi, bj) =


−[b2i + 1 + aibj] if ai ∈]0, 1], bi ∈ [0, 1] \ {
ai
4
+
bj+1
4
},
0 if ai = 0, bi ∈ [0,
bj+1
4
[,
1− 1
2
bi if ai = 0, bi ∈]
bj+1
4
, 1],
2 if ai ∈ [0, 1], bi =
ai
4
+
bj+1
4
with i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i. fi is not continuous but it satisfies (AFi 2)–(AFi 3).
(AFi 2) - Let ai = 0, bi ∈ [0,
bj+1
4
[, bj ∈ [0, 1] and let ((ai,n, bi,n, bj,n))n a se-
quence in [0, 1]3 converging to (ai, bi, bj). Then, any converging subsequence
of (fi(ai,n, bi,n, bj,n))n can converge only to −(b
2
i +1) or to 0 = f((ai, bi, bj)).
- Let ai = 0, bi ∈]
bj+1
4
, 1], b2 ∈ [0, 1] and let ((ai,n, bi,n, bj,n))n a sequence
in [0, 1]3 converging to (ai, bi, bj). Then, any converging subsequence of
(fi(ai,n, bi,n, bj,n))n can converge only to−(b
2
i+1) or to 1−
1
2
bi = f((ai, bi, bj)).
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- Let ai = 0, bi =
bj+1
4
, bj ∈ [0, 1] and let ((ai,n, bi,n, bj,n))n a sequence
in [0, 1]3 converging to (ai, bi, bj). Then, any converging subsequence of
(fi(ai,n, bi,n, bj,n))n can converge to−(b
2
i+1), 0, 1−
1
2
bj , or to 2 = f((ai, bi, bj)).
- Let ai ∈]0, 1], bi =
ai
4
+
bj+1
4
, bj ∈ [0, 1] and let ((ai,n, bi,n, bj,n))n a sequence
in [0, 1]3 converging to (ai, bi, bj). Then, any converging subsequence of
(fi(ai,n, bi,n, bj,n))n can converge only to−(b
2
i+1+aibj) or to 2 = f((ai, bi, bj)).
In any case (AFi 2) is satisfied.
(AFi 3) Let (ai, bi, bj) ∈ [0, 1]
3 and let ((ai,n, bj,n))n a sequence converging to (ai, bj) in
[0, 1]2. Then, taken bi,n =
ai,n
4
+
bj,n+1
4
, for any n ∈ N, we have that
lim inf
n→+∞
fi(ai,n, bi,n, bj,n) = fi(ai, bi, bj);
that is (AFi 3) holds with the equality sign.
⋄
Remark 4.3.3 Let i = 1, . . . , k. When li does not depend from vi, Theo-
rem 4.3.1 still holds if we require the quasiconcavity of fi(ai, ·, b−i), for any
(ai, b−i) ∈ Ai × B−i, instead of assumption (AFi 4). Moreover, assumption
(ALi 4) can be weaken requiring li(·, b) quasiconcave on Ai, for any b ∈ B.
In order to reduce the set of Nash equilibria, we will consider in the next
section a selection criterion generalizing the concept considered in Section 4.1.
4.4 Equilibria under passive beliefs: definition
and existence result
As anticipated, the unique subgame of the two–stage game with vertical
separation presented in Section 4.2 is the whole game, so the set of subgame
perfect Nash equilibria coincides with the set of Nash equilibria. A method
for selecting among the Nash equilibria is suggested by the concept of perfect
Bayesian equilibrium (see for example Fudenberg and Tirole [26] or Mas-
Colell et al. [58]). Let us extend the definition of perfect Bayesian equilibrium
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given in [58] for a multi–stage game with partially observed actions when the
sets of actions of the players have cardinality infinite.
Note that we aim to give a definition that is independent from the specific
extensive form representation of the two–stage game. Let Pi be the set of
all the probability measures on A−i, for i = 1, . . . , k.
Definition 4.4.1
A system of beliefs of Fi is a family of probability measures µi = (µ
ai
i )ai∈Ai
in Pi where µ
ai
i represents the beliefs that Fi has about the actions chosen
by leaders L−i after observing an action ai of leader Li.
A system of beliefs is a profile µ = (µ1, . . . , µk), such that µi is a system of
beliefs of Fi, for any i = 1, . . . , k.
The expected payoff (see, for example, Billingsley [7]) of follower Fi, if
he plays the action bi as response to the observed action ai of Li and to the
strategy profile β−i ∈ S
−i of followers F−i, given the system of beliefs µi of
Fi, is:
fµii (ai, bi, β−i) =
∫
A−i
fi(ai, bi, β−i(a−i)) dµ
ai
i (a−i). (4.27)
So, we can give the following definition.
Definition 4.4.2
A strategy profile s∗ = (a∗1, . . . , a
∗
k, β
∗
1 , . . . , β
∗
k) with the system of beliefs
µ = (µ1, . . . , µk) is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the two–stage game
with vertical separation if, for any i = 1, . . . , k:
(i) any follower Fi is playing optimally, assuming that he is in the second
stage and he has the system of beliefs µi; that is we have:
fµii (ai, β
∗
i (ai), β
∗
−i) = max
bi∈Bi
fµii (ai, bi, β
∗
−i) for any ai ∈ Ai;
(ii) the leader’s equilibrium action is such that:
lˇi(a
∗
i , β
∗
i (a
∗
i ), β
∗
−i(a
∗
−i)) = max
ai∈Ai
lˇi(ai, β
∗
i (ai), β
∗
−i(a
∗
−i)),
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where lˇi is defined as in (4.26);
(iii) the system of beliefs µ satisfies the following consistency hypothesis:
µ
a∗i
i (a−i) =

1, if a−i = a
∗
−i,
0, otherwise.
(4.28)
The consistency requirement corresponds to the requirement (ii) in the
definition of weak perfect Bayesian equilibrium in [58, Definition 9.C.3] and
it ensures that the followers’ beliefs are compatible with the equilibrium
strategy profile along the equilibrium path, that is the followers have correct
beliefs in equilibrium. Then, a perfect Bayesian equilibrium is a Nash equi-
librium. Furthermore, the compatibility requirement does not impose any
restriction out of the equilibrium path. So, the concept of perfect Bayesian
equilibrium may be not sufficient to select among all Nash equilibria. For
this reason we restrict our attention only on the equilibria that are supported
by the system of beliefs called passive beliefs. A follower of a two–stage game
with vertical separation has passive beliefs about the action chosen by the
leaders L−i if, when he observes an action of leader Li different from the
one he expects in equilibrium, he does not revise his beliefs about the ac-
tion offered to the rival follower even if his corresponding leader is deviating.
That is, given an equilibrium strategy profile a∗ = (a∗i , a
∗
−i) of leaders, if Fi
observes an action different from a∗i , he believes that the other leaders are
still playing a∗−i. Formally:
Definition 4.4.3
The strategy profile (a∗1, . . . , a
∗
k, β
∗
1 , . . . , β
∗
k) is an equilibrium under passive
beliefs of a two–stage game with vertical separation if it is a perfect Bayesian
equilibrium with the system of beliefs µ = (µ1, . . . , µk) defined by:
µaii (a−i) =

1, if a−i = a
∗
−i
0, otherwise,
for any ai ∈ Ai, for any i = 1 . . . , k; that is µ
ai
i is a unit mass at a
∗
−i, for any
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ai ∈ Ai, for i = 1, . . . , k.
Then, a system of passive beliefs for player Fi is independent on the action
a−i of leaders L−i.
Since condition (4.27) in case of passive beliefs is equivalent to:
fµii (ai, bi, β−i) = fi(ai, bi, β−i(a
∗
−i)), (4.29)
that is, the strategies of the followers F−i affect the payoff of follower Fi only
through the actions they choose as response to their leaders’ equilibrium
strategies, a strategy profile s∗ = (a∗1, . . . , a
∗
k, β
∗
1 , . . . , β
∗
k) is an equilibrium
under passive beliefs of the two–stage game with vertical separation if for
any i = 1, . . . , k:
(i) the strategy β∗i of Fi solves:
fi(ai, β
∗
i (a
∗
i ), β
∗
−i(a
∗
−i)) = max
bi∈Bi
fi(ai, bi, β
∗
−i(a
∗
−i)) for any ai ∈ Ai;
(ii) the action a∗i of Li solves:
lˇi(a
∗
i , β
∗
i (a
∗
i ), β
∗
−i(a
∗
−i)) = max
ai∈Ai
lˇi(ai, β
∗
i (ai), β
∗
−i(a
∗
−i)),
where lˇi is defined in (4.26).
In Figure 4.2 is represented the interaction scheme between 2 leaders and
2 followers with vertical separation under passive beliefs.
Taken as given the action of the other followers, leader Li and the correspond-
ing follower Fi act as a team that solves a parametric Bilevel Optimization
problem. In other words, the strategic interaction is between the two teams.
Then, taken as given the action b−i in B−i of followers F−i, a possible
strategy profile for team Li–Fi is a couple that maximizes payoff functions
of both Li and Fi taking into account the hierarchical structure between Li
and Fi. As in (4.17), denote with B˜i(ai, b−i) the follower reaction set to
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b2
L1
F1
b1
b1
L2
F2
b2
Figure 4.2: Interaction scheme in passive beliefs
the action ai ∈ Ai of leader Li, for any fixed b−i in B−i. That is B˜i(ai, b−i)
is the set of solutions to the optimization problem:
Pi(ai, b−i)

find bi ∈ Bi such thatfi(ai, bi, b−i) = maxb′i∈Bi fi(ai, b′i, b−i). (4.30)
In the following, for any i = 1, . . . , k, a very useful condition will be:
(Ii) for any (ai, b−i) ∈ Ai × B−i, the reaction set B˜i(ai, b−i) of Fi is a
singleton, that is
B˜i(ai, b−i) = {b˜i(ai, b−i)}. (4.31)
Sufficient conditions for assumption (Ii) are given, for example, by:
Lemma 4.4.4. Let i = 1, . . . , k. Assume that (AFi 1) and (AFi 2) hold and
fi(ai, ·, b−i) is a strictly D–pseudoconcave function on Bi. Then Pi(ai, b−i)
has a unique solution.
Proof. See Proposition 2.1.22 and Theorem A.2.5. ⋄
Then, we can define the function l˜i from Ai × B−i to R by:
l˜i(ai, b−i) = li(ai, b˜i(ai, b−i), b−i, vi(ai, b−i)). (4.32)
So, the problem of leader Li is described by:
Si(b−i)

find ai ∈ Ai such thatl˜i(ai, b−i) = maxa′i∈Ai l˜i(a′i, b−i). (4.33)
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Definition 4.4.5
A strategy profile (a∗, β∗) = (a∗1, . . . , a
∗
k, β
∗
1 , . . . , β
∗
k) is an equilibrium under
passive beliefs of the two–stage game with vertical separation if it solves, for
i = 1, . . . , k, the problems:
a∗i solves S(b
∗
−i) (4.34a)
and
β∗i (ai) = b˜i(ai, b
∗
−i) for any ai ∈ Ai. (4.34b)
where
b∗−i = β
∗
−i(a
∗
−i). (4.34c)
In an equivalent way, we can describe a vertical separated equilibrium as
a fixed point of an appropriate set–valued map.
Let Xi = Ai × Bi, X−i = A−i × B−i and X = A× B. Define the set–valued
map Mi from B−i to Ai such that
Mi(b−i) = Argmax
ai∈Ai
l˜i(ai, b−i), (4.35)
for any b−i ∈ B−i. Define the set–valued map Ni from X−i to Xi such that
Ni(x−i) = Ni(a−i, b−i) = {(ai, bi) ∈ Xi : ai ∈Mi(b−i), bi = b˜i(ai, b−i)},
(4.36)
for any x−i = (a−i, b−i) ∈ X−i, and the set–valued map
N : X ⇒ X, (4.37)
such that N(x) =
∏k
i=1Ni(x−i), for any x ∈ X.
It follows that:
Lemma 4.4.6. Any fixed point of N on X can be associated to an equilibrium
under passive beliefs of the two–stage game Γ with vertical separation, and
vice versa.
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Proof. Let (a∗1, . . . , a
∗
k, β
∗
1 , . . . , β
∗
k) be an equilibrium under passive beliefs.
Then, β∗i (ai) = b˜i(ai, b
∗
−i) for any ai ∈ Ai and, denoted β
∗
i (a
∗
i ) by b
∗
i , we
have that x∗ = (a∗1, . . . , a
∗
k, b
∗
1, . . . , b
∗
k) is a fixed point of N on X, that is
x∗ ∈ N(x∗).
Vice versa, if (a∗1, . . . , a
∗
k, b
∗
1, . . . , b
∗
k) is a fixed point of N on X, then one
can easily verify that the strategy profile (a∗1, . . . , a
∗
k, β
∗
1 , . . . , β
∗
k) such that
β∗i (ai) = b˜i(ai, β
∗
−i(a
∗
i )), for any ai ∈ Ai and i = 1 . . . , k is an equilibrium
under passive beliefs of Γ. ⋄
Let us study the properties of the set–valued map N .
First, we prove that b˜i is a continuous function.
Proposition 4.4.7. Let i = 1, . . . , k. Assume (Ii), (AFi 2)–(AFi 3) and
(AFi 5) Bi is a nonempty compact subset of R
mi.
Then, b˜i and vi are continuous functions on Ai × B−i.
Proof. In the proof of Theorem 4.3.1 it is proved that if (ai,n, b−i,n) converges
to (ai, b−i) in Ai × B−i then b˜i, considered as a set–valued map, is closed.
This property, together with the compactness of Bi, gives the continuity of
b˜i (Proposition 2.2.8–(i)).
The continuity of the optimal value function vi is proved in Theorem 4.3.1. ⋄
Now, we prove that N(x) is nonempty and closed, for any x ∈ X.
Proposition 4.4.8. Let i = 1, . . . , k. Assume (Ii), (AFi 5) and
(ALi 5) Ai is a nonempty compact subset of R
ni;
(ALi 6) li(·, ·, b−i, ·) is upper semicontinuous on Ai × Bi × R, for any
b−i ∈ B−i;
(AFi 6) fi(·, ·, b−i) is upper semicontinuous on Ai×Bi, for any b−i ∈ B−i;
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(AFi 7) for any (ai, bi) ∈ Ai × Bi, for any sequence (ai,n)n converging to
ai in Ai, there exists a sequence (bˆi,n)n in Bi such that:
lim inf
n→∞
fi(ai,n, bˆi,n, b−i) ≥ fi(ai, bi, b−i),
for any b−i ∈ B−i.
Then, Ni(x−i) defined in (4.36) is nonempty, for any x−i ∈ X−i.
Proof. It can be proved using Proposition 2.4.2. For the sake of completeness
let us prove it directly.
Let i = 1, . . . , k and x−i = (a−i, b−i) ∈ X. Let us observe that substituting
assumptions (AFi 2)–(AFi 3) in Proposition 4.4.7 with weaker assumptions
(AFi 6)–(AFi 7) and replicating the proof we can prove that b˜i(·, b−i) and
vi(·, b−i) are continuous on Ai.
Let (ai,n)n be a sequence converging to ai. From assumption (ALi 6) and
from the continuity of b˜i(·, b−i) and vi(·, b−i) we have:
lim sup
n→+∞
l˜i(ai,n, b−i) = lim sup
n→+∞
li(ai,n, b˜i(ai,n, b−i), b−i, vi(ai,n, b−i))
≤ li(ai, b˜i(ai, b−i), b−i, vi(ai, b−i)) = l˜i(ai, b−i), (4.38)
that is l˜i(·, b−i) is upper semicontinuous on Ai. Then, Mi(b−i) is nonempty
since Ai is compact. So, Ni(x−i) is nonempty. ⋄
In the next proposition we prove that any set–valued map Ni is closed.
Proposition 4.4.9. Let i = 1, . . . , k. Assume (Ii), (ALi 2), (ALi 5),
(AFi 2), (AFi 3), (AFi 5), and
(ALi 7) li(ai, ·, ·, ·) is lower semicontinuous on Bi × B−i × R, for any
ai ∈ Ai.
Then, the set–valued map Ni is closed.
Proof. Let b−i ∈ B−i and let (b−i,n)n be a sequence converging to b−i in B−i.
Let a¯i ∈ Lim supn→+∞Mi(b−i,n). By definition, there exists a set K1 ⊆ N
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countably infinite and a sequence (a¯i,n)n∈K1 such that a¯i,n ∈Mi(b−i,n) for all
n ∈ K1 and such that a¯i,n converges to a¯i.
Let a′i be in Ai. From (ALi 7) and from the continuity of b˜i(a
′
i, ·) and vi(a
′
i, ·)
on B−i, we have
l˜i(a
′
i, b−i) ≤ lim inf
n→+∞
l˜i(a
′
i, b−i,n). (4.39)
On the other hand, from the upper semicontinuity of li and the continuity of
both b˜i and vi, we have:
lim sup
n→+∞
n∈K1
l˜i(a¯i,n, b−i,n) ≤ l˜i(a¯i, b−i). (4.40)
But a¯i,n ∈Mi(b−i,n) for any n ∈ K1. Then, we have
l˜i(a¯i,n, b−i,n) ≥ li(zi, b−i,n) for any zi ∈ Ai. (4.41)
Putting zi = a
′
i in (4.41), from (4.39) and (4.40) we obtain
l˜i(a
′
i, b−i) = lim
n→+∞
l˜i(a
′
i, b−i,n) = lim sup
n→+∞
n∈K1
l˜i(a
′
i, b−i,n)
≤ lim sup
n→+∞
n∈K1
l˜i(a¯i,n, b−i,n) ≤ l˜i(a¯i, b−i),
(4.42)
that is a¯i is in Mi(b−i). Thus, it is proved that
Lim sup
n→+∞
Mi(b−i,n) ⊆Mi(b−i), (4.43)
that is Mi is a closed set–valued map. Then, from the continuity of b˜i, we
obtain that Ni, is a closed set–valued map. ⋄
Remark 4.4.10 If li and fi are continuous in Ai × Bi, then the assumptions
on the payoff functions in Proposition 4.4.9 are satisfied. Vice versa there
are functions that satisfy the hypothesis in Proposition 4.4.9 that are not
continuous. An example for the problem of the followers is in Example 4.3.1.
In the following example we discuss the problem of the leaders.
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Example 4.4.1 Let Ai = Bi = [0, 1], for i = 1, 2. Let li be a real–valued
function defined on [0, 1]3 ×R by:
li(ai, bi, bj, t) =

(bi + bj − ai + t)
2 if ai ∈]0, 1],
(bi + bj + t)
2 + 1 if ai = 0.
with i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i. li is not continuous but it satisfies (ALi 2)–(ALi 7)
(ALi 2) li is discontinuous at any point (ai, bi, bj , t) ∈ {0}×[0, 1]
2×R. Then, let bi, bj , t ∈
[0, 1]2×R and (ai,n, bi,n, bj,n, tn)n be a sequence converging to (0, bi, bj , t) in [0, 1]
3×
R. Any converging subsequence of (fi(ai,n, bi,n, bj,n, tn))n converges to (bi+bj+ t)
2
or to (bi + bj + t)
2 + 1 = f(0, bi, bj). Then, li is upper semicontinuous on [0, 1]
3.
(ALi 7) It is straightforward.
⋄
The next theorem gives a sufficient condition for the existence of an equi-
librium under passive beliefs.
Theorem 4.4.11. Assume, for i = 1, . . . , k:
(Ii) the reaction set B˜i(ai, b−i) of Fi is a singleton, that is B˜i(ai, b−i) =
{b˜i(ai, b−i)}, for any (ai, b−i) ∈ Ai × B−i;
(ALi 1) Ai is a nonempty compact convex subset of R
ni;
(ALi 2) li is a real–valued upper semicontinuous function on Ai × B ×R;
(ALi 7) li(ai, ·, ·, ·) is lower semicontinuous on Bi × B−i × R, for any
ai ∈ Ai;
(AFi 1) Bi is a nonempty compact convex subset of R
mi;
(AFi 2) fi is a real–valued upper semicontinuous function on Ai × B;
(AFi 3) for any (ai, bi, b−i) ∈ Ai ×B, for any sequence ((ai,n, b−i,n))n con-
verging to (ai, b−i) in Ai × B−i, there exists a sequence (bˆi,n)n in Bi such
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that:
lim inf
n→∞
fi(ai,n, bˆi,n, b−i,n) ≥ fi(ai, bi, b−i).
Furthermore, assume that
(A 1) the set valued function N is convex–valued.
Then, there exists an equilibrium under passive beliefs of the two–stage
game Γ with vertical separation.
Proof. The set–valued map N satisfies the hypothesis of Kakutani Fixed
Point Theorem (Theorem 2.2.14). Indeed, from Proposition 4.4.8 and as-
sumption (A 1), N is nonempty convex–valued and, from Proposition 4.4.9,
N is closed. Then, from Lemma 4.4.6 we have the thesis. ⋄
The main problem for the existence of an equilibrium under passive beliefs
is associated to the possible lack of convexity of the values of the set–valued
map N . The next proposition gives sufficient conditions for the convexity of
the values of N .
Proposition 4.4.12. Let i = 1, . . . , k. Let Ai and Bi be convex subset of
R
ni and Rmi, respectively. Assume (Ii) and:
(ALi 8) li(·, ·, b−i, ·) is quasiconcave on Ai×Bi×R, for any b−i ∈ B−i and
li(ai, bi, b−i, ·) is nondecreasing (nonincreasing) on R;
(AFi 8) b˜i(·, b−i) is linear on Ai, for any b−i ∈ B−i, and the optimal value
function vi(·, b−i) is concave (convex) on Ai, for any b−i ∈ B−i.
Then the set–valued map Ni is convex–valued.
Proof. Let x−i ∈ X−i and (a
′
i, b
′
i), (a
′′
i , b
′′
i ) ∈ Ni(x−i). By definition, we have
a′i, a
′′
i ∈ Mi(b−i) and b
′
i = b˜i(a
′
i, b−i), b
′′
i = b˜i(a
′′
i , b−i). Let λ ∈]0, 1[. From
the linearity of b˜i(·, b−i) on Ai it follows that λb
′
i + (1− λ)b
′′
i = b˜i(λa
′
i + (1−
λ)a′′i , b−i).
Furthermore, from Proposition 2.1.27 we have that l˜i(·, b−i) is quasiconcave
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on Ai. So, from Proposition 2.1.3, we have λa
′
i+(1−λ)a
′′
i ∈Mi(b−i). Finally,
from the linearity of b˜i(·, b−i), we have that Ni(x−i) is a convex set. Then,
N is a convex–valued map. ⋄
A sufficient condition in order to have b˜i linear and vi concave is given
by:
Proposition 4.4.13. Let i = 1, . . . , k. Let Ai and Bi be strictly convex
(resp. convex) subset of Rni and Rmi, respectively. Assume (Ii) and:
(AFi 9) fi(·, ·, b−i) is concave on int(Ai)× int(Bi) (resp. Ai×Bi), for any
b−i ∈ B−i, and fi(·, bi, b−i) is convex on Ai, for any (bi, b−i) ∈ Bi × B−i.
Then, b˜i(·, b−i) is linear on Ai and vi(·, b−i) is concave on Ai, for any b−i ∈
B−i, that is (AFi 8) is verified.
Proof. We prove only the case in which fi is concave on int(Ai)× int(Bi) and
Ai, Bi are strictly convex. The other case is straightforward.
Let b−i ∈ B−i, a
′
i, a
′′
i ∈ Ai and λ ∈]0, 1[. Observe that λa
′
i+(1−λ) a
′′
i ∈ int(Ai)
and λb˜i(a
′
i, b−i) + (1− λ)b˜i(a
′′
i , b−i) ∈ int(Bi), for any λ ∈]0, 1[, being Ai and
Bi strictly convex sets.
Then, from the concavity of fi on int(Ai)×int(Bi) and from the definition
of b˜i we have:
fi(λa
′
i + (1− λ)a
′′
i , λb˜i(a
′
i, b−i) + (1− λ)b˜i(a
′′
i , b−i), b−i) ≥
≥ λfi(a
′
i, b˜i(a
′
i, b−i), b−i) + (1− λ)fi(a
′′
i , b˜i(a
′′
i , b−i), b−i)
≥ λfi(a
′
i, bi, b−i) + (1− λ)fi(a
′′
i , bi, b−i) for any bi ∈ Bi.
That is, from the convexity of fi(·, bi) on Ai:
fi(λa
′
i + (1− λ)a
′′
i , λb˜i(a
′
i, b−i) + (1− λ)b˜i(a
′′
i , b−i), b−i) ≥
fi(λa
′
i + (1− λ)a
′′
i , bi, b−i) for any bi ∈ Bi;
and then λb˜i(a
′
i, b−i) + (1− λ)b˜i(a
′′
i , b−i) = b˜i(λa
′
i + (1− λ)a
′′
i , b−i), that is b˜i
is linear on Ai.
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The concavity of vi(·, b−i) follows from Proposition 2.3.6 if we observe again
that if Ai (Bi) is a strictly convex set each combination of points of Ai (Bi)
is in the interior of the set. ⋄
Example 4.4.2 We present an example where both leaders’ and followers’
payoff functions that satisfy all the conditions required for the existence of
an equilibrium under passive beliefs.
Let Ai = Bi = Bj = [0, 1] and
fi(ai, bi, bj) =

(1−
bj
2
)(ai − b
j
i ) + 2 if bi 6= 0
3 + aibj otherwise.
for i, j = 1, 2 and j 6= i.
Then fi satisfies (AFi 2), (AFi 3) and (AFi 9) (being Ai a strictly convex
subset of R).
Indeed:
(AFi 2) f is discontinuous at any point (ai, bi, bj) ∈ [0, 1]× {0} × [0, 1]. So, let (ai, bj) ∈
[0, 1]2 and (ai,n, bi,n, bj,n)n be a sequence that converges to (ai, 0, bj) in [0, 1]
3.
Any subsequence of (fi(ai,n, bi,n, bj,n))n can converge only to 3+aibj or (1−
bj
2
)ai+2.
Then (AFi 2) is satisfied being fi(ai, 0, bj) = 3 + aibj > (1 −
bj
2
)ai + 2, for any
(ai, bj) ∈ [0, 1]
2.
(AFi 3) Let (ai, bj) ∈ [0, 1]
2 and (ai,n, bj,n)n be a sequence that converges to (ai, bj) in
[0, 1]2. Take bi,n = 0, for any n ∈ N. Then fi(ai,n, 0, bj,n) = 3 + ai,nbj,n that
converges to 3 + aibj . Hence, condition in (AFi 3) holds with the equality sign.
(AFi 9) It is quite immediate if we observe that Ai, Bi are strictly convex subsets of R,
the discontinuity is on the boundary and fi(·, ·, bj) is concave on ]0, 1[
2, for any bj .
Moreover,
li(ai, bi, bj) =


b2j(1− a
2
i ) if ai 6= 0,
1 + bi + bj + t if ai = 0, t ≥ 0,
1 + bi + bj otherwise,
satisfies (ALi 2), (ALi 7) and and (ALi 8).
82
4.5 Particular cases: existence results under weaker conditions
(ALi 2) li is discontinuous is discontinuous at any point (ai, bi, bj , t) ∈ {0} × [0, 1]
2 ×R.
So, let (bi, bj , t) ∈ [0, 1]
2 ×R and (ai,n, bi,n, bj,n, tn)n be a sequence that converges
to (0, bi, bj , t) in [0, 1]
3 × R. If t > 0, a subsequence of (li(ai,n, bi,n, bj,n, tn))n
can converge only to b2j (1 − a
2
i ) or to 1 + bi + bj + t. If t ≤ 0, a subsequence of
(li(ai,n, bi,n, bj,n, tn))n can converge only to b
2
j (1−a
2
i ) or to 1+bi+bj . In both cases
(ALi 2) is satisfied, being b
2
j (1− a
2
i ) < li(0, bi, bj , t), for any (bi, bj , t) ∈ [0, 1]
2 ×R.
(ALi 7) It is straightforward.
(ALi 8) let bj ∈ [0, 1]. Denoted with Λα the upper level set at height α of li(·, ·, bj , ·),
that is Λα = {(ai, bi, t) : li(ai, bi, bj , t) ≥ α}, we have:
Λα =


[0, 1]× [0, 1R]×R if α < 0
[0,
√
1− α
b2
j
]× [0, 1]×R if 0 ≤ α < b2j
{0} × [0, 1]×R if b2j ≤ α ≤ 1 + bj
{(0, bi, t) : t+ bi ≥ α− 1− bj , t ≥ 0, bi ∈ [0, 1]} if α > 1 + bj
(4.44)
that are convex sets, for any α.
⋄
With the characterization of an equilibrium under passive beliefs given
in Lemma 4.4.6, the hypothesis of linearity of b˜i is necessary to prove an
existence result. So, the scope of the next section is to reformulate the
problem in order to find weaker conditions for the existence of an equilibrium
under passive beliefs.
4.5 Particular cases: existence results under
weaker conditions
In this section we consider particular classes of two–stage games with vertical
separation. For each one of these classes we give a characterization of the
concept of equilibrium under passive beliefs that simplifies the analysis of the
existence of equilibria.
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First, when the solution of any leader’s problem is a singleton for any action
profile b−i of the followers F−i, we prove an existence result without concavity
assumptions.
Then, we assume that the followers’ actions spaces are subsets of R. Exis-
tence results are proved assuming that the optimal reaction of any follower
is first concave and then isotone.
In the last case we consider the situation in which the problem of any fol-
lower may have more than one solution but the payoff function of any leader
depends on the action of the corresponding follower only through the optimal
value function.
4.5.1 In case of uniqueness of the leader’s optimal reac-
tion
Let b˜i be the optimal reaction of the follower Fi defined in (4.31). In this
section we assume that Mi defined in (4.35) is a single–valued map.
More precisely, assume for any i = 1, . . . , k:
(Ii) the reaction set B˜i(ai, b−i) = Argmaxbi∈Bi fi(ai, bi, b−i) of Fi is a sin-
gleton, that is B˜i(ai, b−i) = {b˜i(ai, b−i)}, for any (ai, b−i) ∈ Ai × B−i;
(Ji) Mi(b−i) = Argmaxai∈Ai l˜i(ai, b˜i(ai, b−i), b−i, vi(ai, b−i)) is a singleton,
that is Mi(b−i) = {a¯i(b−i)}, for any b−i ∈ B−i.
Define the following vector function
b¯(b) = (b˜1(a¯1(b−1), b−1), . . . , b˜k(a¯k(b−k), b−k)), (4.45)
for any b ∈ B, where the i-th component of b¯ corresponds to the optimal
reaction of the follower Fi to the optimal reaction of the leader Li given the
parameter b−i.
Lemma 4.5.1. Any fixed point of b¯ on B can be associated to an equilibrium
under passive beliefs of the two–stage game Γ with vertical separation, and
vice versa.
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Proof. Let b∗ = (b∗1, . . . , b
∗
k) be a fixed point of b¯ on B. Then, accord-
ing to the definition, we have b∗i = b˜i(a¯i(b
∗
−i), b
∗
−i), for i = 1, . . . , k. So,
taken a∗i = a¯i(b
∗
−i), the strategy profile (a
∗
1, . . . , a
∗
k, β1
∗, . . . , β∗k) is an equilib-
rium under passive beliefs, where β∗i is a function from Ai to Bi such that
βi
∗(ai) = b˜i(ai, b
∗
−i) for any ai ∈ Ai and i = 1, . . . , k.
Vice versa, one can easily verify that if (a∗1, . . . , a
∗
k, β
∗
1 , . . . , β
∗
k) is an equilib-
rium under passive beliefs, then (β∗1(a
∗
i ), . . . , β
∗
k(a
∗
k)) is a fixed point of b¯ on
B. ⋄
Now, let us give a preliminary result on the function a¯i.
Proposition 4.5.2. Let i = 1, . . . , k. Assume (Ii), (Ji), (ALi 2), (ALi 5),
(ALi 7), (AFi 2), (AFi 3), (AFi 5). Then the function a¯i is continuous on
B−i.
Proof. From Proposition 4.4.7, b˜i is continuous on Ai × B−i and, from the
proof of Proposition 4.4.9, Mi is a closed single–valued map. This fact,
together with the compactness of Ai, gives the thesis. ⋄
Finally, we can state:
Theorem 4.5.3. Assume, for i = 1, . . . , k:
(Ii) the reaction set B˜i(ai, b−i) of Fi is a singleton, that is B˜i(ai, b−i) =
{b˜i(ai, b−i)}, for any (ai, b−i) ∈ Ai × B−i;
(Ji) Mi(b−i) is a singleton, that is Mi(b−i) = {a¯i(b−i)}, for any b−i ∈ B−i;
(ALi 1) Ai is a nonempty compact convex subset of R
ni;
(ALi 2) li is a real–valued upper semicontinuous function on Ai × B ×R;
(ALi 7) li(ai, ·, ·, ·) is lower semicontinuous on Bi × B−i × R, for any
ai ∈ Ai;
(AFi 1) Bi is a nonempty compact convex subset of R
mi;
(AFi 2) fi is a real–valued upper semicontinuous function on Ai × B;
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(AFi 3) for any (ai, bi, b−i) ∈ Ai ×B, for any sequence ((ai,n, b−i,n))n con-
verging to (ai, b−i) in Ai × B−i, there exists a sequence (bˆi,n)n in Bi such
that:
lim inf
n→∞
fi(ai,n, bˆi,n, b−i,n) ≥ fi(ai, bi, b−i).
Then, there exists an equilibrium under passive beliefs of the two–stage
game Γ with vertical separation.
Proof. The function b¯ satisfies the hypothesis of the Brouwer Theorem (The-
orem A.2.2 in the Appendix). Indeed, from propositions 4.4.7 and 4.5.2, b¯ is
continuous on B, with B compact and convex, so there exists a fixed point of
b¯ on B. Then, from Lemma 4.5.1, there exists an equilibrium under passive
beliefs of the two–stage game with vertical separation. ⋄
4.5.2 In case of nonuniqueness of the leader’s optimal
reaction
Assume that (Ii) is satified for any i = 1, . . . , k, where:
(Ii) the reaction set B˜i(ai, b−i) = Argmaxbi∈Bi fi(ai, bi, b−i) of Fi is a sin-
gleton, that is B˜i(ai, b−i) = {b˜i(ai, b−i)}, for any (ai, b−i) ∈ Ai × B−i.
Let Mi be the set–valued map from B−i to Ai defined in (4.35); that is
Mi(b−i) = Argmax
ai∈Ai
li(ai, b˜i(ai, b−i), b−i, vi(ai, b−i)),
for any b−i ∈ B−i and for i = 1, . . . , k.
We define the set–valued map Ei from B−i to Bi such that:
Ei(b−i) = {b˜i(ai, b−i) | ai ∈Mi(b−i)}. (4.46)
Let
E(b) =
k∏
i=1
Ei(b−i). (4.47)
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Lemma 4.5.4. Any fixed point of the set valued–map E on B can be asso-
ciated to an equilibrium under passive beliefs of the two–stage game Γ with
vertical separation, and vice versa.
Proof. Let b∗ = (b∗1, . . . , b
∗
k) be a fixed point of E on B. According to
the definition of E, there exists a∗i ∈ Mi(b
∗
−i) such that b
∗
i = b˜i(a
∗
i , b
∗
−i),
for i = 1, . . . , k. Then, the strategy profile (a∗1, . . . , a
∗
k, β
∗
1 , . . . , β
∗
k), where
β∗i (ai) = b˜i(ai, b
∗
−i) for any ai ∈ Ai, for i = 1, . . . , k, is a vertical separated
equilibrium under passive beliefs. Vice versa, if (a∗1, . . . , a
∗
k, β
∗
1 , . . . , β
∗
k) is a
vertical separated equilibrium under passive beliefs, then one can easily verify
that (β∗1(a
∗
i ), . . . , β
∗
k(a
∗
k)) is a fixed point of E on B. ⋄
The next proposition shows that if Mi is a convex–valued and closed
set–valued map then there exists an equilibrium under passive beliefs of Γ.
Proposition 4.5.5. Let i = 1, . . . , k. Assume, for i = 1, . . . , k, (Ii), (ALi 1),
(ALi 2), (ALi 7), (AFi 1)–(AFi 3). If Mi is convex–valued, for any i =
1, . . . , k, then the set–valued map E has a fixed point on B.
Proof. It is a direct consequence of Theorem 3.2.1. Indeed, from Proposi-
tion 4.4.7 we have that b˜i is continuous on Ai×B−i, for i = 1, . . . , k. So, also
the function b˜ : A× B → B defined by b˜(a, b) = (b˜1(a1, b−1), . . . , b˜k(ak, b−k))
is continuous on A × B. From a result in Proposition 4.4.9, we have that
Mi is a closed set–valued map and, being Ai compact, it is also compact–
valued, for i = 1, . . . , k. Defined the set–valued map M : B ⇒ A as M(b) =∏k
i=1Mi(b−i), we obtain thatM is closed and with nonempty compact convex
values. So, we have the thesis if we observe that:
E(b) = {b′ ∈ B : b′i ∈ Ei(b−i), for i = 1, . . . , k}
= {b′ ∈ B : ∃ai ∈Mi(b−i) s.t. b
′
i = b˜i(ai, b−i), for i = 1, . . . , k}
= {b˜(a, b) : a ∈M(b)}.
⋄
87
4. Selection of equilibria for two-stage games with vertical separation: existence results
So, in the following we consider explicit classes of problems and we inves-
tigate conditions under which Mi is convex–valued.
Assume in this section that the actions sets of the followers are subsets
of R.
Proposition 4.5.6. Let i = 1, . . . , k. Assume that (Ii) is satisfied. Let Ai
be a nonempty compact convex subset of Rni and Bi be a nonempty compact
convex subset of R. Let b−i ∈ B−i and assume that li(·, ·, b−i, ·) is quasi-
concave on Ai × Bi × R and li(ai, ·, b−i, ·) is componentwise nondecreasing
(nonincreasing) on Bi×R. Moreover, assume that b˜i(·, b−i) and vi(·, b−i) are
concave (convex) on Ai.
Then, the function l˜i(·, b−i) defined in (4.32) is quasiconcave on Ai and
Mi(b−i) is a convex set.
Proof. The quasiconcavity of l˜i(·, b−i) follows from Proposition 2.1.27. Then,
from Proposition 2.1.3, Mi(b−i) is convex. ⋄
By application of the new result Theorem 3.1.1, the following theorem
gives an existence result using the concavity of b˜i(·, b−i).
Theorem 4.5.7. Assume, for i = 1, . . . , k:
(ALi 1) Ai is a nonempty compact convex subset of R
ni;
(ALi 2) li is a real–valued upper semicontinuous function on Ai × B× R;
(ALi 7) li(ai, ·, ·, ·) is lower semicontinuous on Bi × B−i × R, for any
ai ∈ Ai;
(ALi 9) li(·, ·, b−i, ·) is quasiconcave on Ai × Bi × R, for any b−i ∈ B−i;
li(ai, ·, b−i, ·) is componentwise nondecreasing on Bi × R, for any (ai, b−i) ∈
Ai × B−i;
(AFi 2) fi is a real–valued upper semicontinuous function on Ai × B;
(AFi 3) for any (ai, bi, b−i) ∈ Ai ×B, for any sequence ((ai,n, b−i,n))n con-
verging to (ai, b−i) in Ai × B−i, there exists a sequence (bˆi,n)n in Bi such
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that:
lim inf
n→∞
fi(ai,n, bˆi,n, b−i,n) ≥ fi(ai, bi, b−i);
(AFi 10) Bi is a nonempty compact interval of R;
(AFi 11) fi(·, ·, b−i) is concave on Ai × B−i, for any b−i ∈ B−i;
(AFi 12)

fi(ai, ·, b−i) is strictly D–pseudoconcave on Bi,
for any (ai, b−i) ∈ int(Ai)× B−i;
Dfi(·, ·, b−i) is quasiconcave on Ai × Bi for any b−i ∈ B−i;
D+fi(ai, ·, b−i)(minBi) > 0, for any ai ∈ Ai.
Then, there exists an equilibrium under passive beliefs of the two–stage
game Γ with vertical separation.
Proof. First, observe that assumption (Ii) on the uniqueness of values of B˜i
is not necessary. Indeed, it follows from Proposition 2.1.22.
Then, the result follows from Proposition 4.5.5 and the fact that, by applica-
tion of Proposition 2.1.24, Mi is convex–valued. Indeed, from Theorem 3.1.1,
we have that b˜i(·, b−i) is concave on Ai, for any b−i ∈ B−i. From Proposi-
tion 2.3.6 we have that vi(·, b−i) is concave on Ai, for any b−i ∈ B−i.
Then, from Proposition 4.5.6 we have the thesis.
⋄
Remark 4.5.8 As shown in Proposition 2.14, the assumption (AFi 11) is suf-
ficient for the concavity of the optimal value function vi(·, b−i) on Ai. If the
sets Ai and Bi are strictly convex, we can have the concavity of vi(·, b−i) if
we require fi(·, ·, b−i) concave on int(Ai)× int(Bi), as in Proposition 4.4.13.
We can obtain an alternative existence theorem changing assumptions
(ALi 9) and (AFi 11).
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Theorem 4.5.9. Assume, for i = 1, . . . , k:
(ALi 1) Ai is a nonempty compact convex subset of R
ni;
(ALi 2) li is a real–valued upper semicontinuous function on Ai × B× R;
(ALi 7) li(ai, ·, ·, ·) is lower semicontinuous on Bi × B−i × R, for any
ai ∈ Ai;
(ALi 10) li(·, ·, b−i, ·) is quasiconcave on Ai × Bi × R, for any b−i ∈ B−i;
li(ai, ·, b−i, t) is nondecreasing on Bi, for any (ai, b−i, t) ∈ Ai × B−i × R
and li(ai, bi, b−i, ·) is nonincreasing on R, for any (ai, bi, b−i) ∈ Ai × B;
(AFi 2) fi is a real–valued upper semicontinuous function on Ai × B;
(AFi 3) for any (ai, bi, b−i) ∈ Ai ×B, for any sequence ((ai,n, b−i,n))n con-
verging to (ai, b−i) in Ai × B−i, there exists a sequence (bˆi,n)n in Bi such
that:
lim inf
n→∞
fi(ai,n, bˆi,n, b−i,n) ≥ fi(ai, bi, b−i);
(AFi 10) Bi is a nonempty compact interval of R;
(AFi 12)

fi(ai, ·, b−i) is strictly D–pseudoconcave on Bi,
for any (ai, b−i) ∈ int(Ai)× B−i;
Dfi(·, ·, b−i) is quasiconcave on Ai × Bi for any b−i ∈ B−i,
D+fi(ai, ·, b−i)(minBi) > 0, for any ai ∈ Ai;
(AFi 13) fi(·, bi, b−i) is convex on Ai, for any (bi, b−i) ∈ B.
Then, there exists an equilibrium under passive beliefs of the two–stage
game Γ with vertical separation.
Proof. It is similar to the proof of Theorem 4.5.7. The only difference is that
from Proposition 2.3.7, vi(·, b−i) is convex on Ai, for any b−i ∈ B−i. Then
the result follows from Proposition 2.1.25. ⋄
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Remark 4.5.10 Note that condition (AFi 13) is not incompatible with (AFi 12).
Indeed, a function f : I ⊆ R → R may be both strictly D–pseudoconcave
and convex on I. Consider, for example, the exponential function f(x) = ex.
Example 4.5.1 In the following we give an example of follower’s payoff
function which satisfies the assumption in Theorem 4.5.7. Let Ai = Bi =
Bj = [0, 1] and
fi(ai, bi, bj) =

−b
2
i + 2bi if bi ≤
1
2
(1− ai+bj
2
)2
−(ai + bj)bi otherwise.
for i, j = 1, 2 and j 6= i. Then, f satisfies assumptions (AFi 2), (AFi 3) and
(AFi 12).
(AFi 2) for any (ai, bi, bj) such that bi >
1
2
(
ai+bj
2
−1)2 or bi <
1
2
(
ai+bj
2
−1)2 it is obvious.
Let bi =
1
2
(
ai+bj
2
− 1)2 and ((ai,n, bi,n, bj,n))n a sequence converging to (ai, bi, bj).
Then if there exists a set of index N1 ⊆ N with cardinality infinite such that
bi,n ≤
1
2
(
ai,n+bj,n
2
−1)2, then fi(ai,n, bi,n, bj,n) = −b
2
i,n+2bi,n, for each n ∈ N1 that is
limn→+∞
n∈N1
f(ai,n, bi,n, bj,n) = f(ai, bi, bj); otherwise lim supn→+∞ f(ai,n, bi,n, bj,n) <
f(ai, bi, bj).
(AFi 3) Let (ai, bi, bj) and ((ai,n, bj,n))n a sequence converging to (ai, bj). Again, it is
sufficient to discuss only the case bi =
1
2
(
ai+bj
2
− 1)2. So, let bi =
1
2
(
ai+bj
2
− 1)2
and take bi,n =
1
2
(
ai,n+bj,n
2
− 1)2 ∈ [0, 1
2
]. Then, fi(ai,n, bi,n, bj,n) = −b
2
i,n + 2bi,n
for each n ∈ N and limn→+∞ fi(ai,n, bi,n, bj,n) = −b
2
i + 2bi = fi(ai, bi, bj).
(AFi 12)
D
+
1 fi(ai, bi, bj) =


−2bi + 2 if 0 ≤ bi <
1
2
(1− ai+bj
2
)2,
−∞ if bi =
1
2
(1− ai+bj
2
)2,
−(ai + bj) if
1
2
(1− ai+bj
2
)2 < bi < 1.
D−1 fi(ai, bi, bj) =

−2bi + 2 if 0 < bi ≤
1
2
(1− ai+bj
2
)2,
−(ai + bj) if bi >
1
2
(1− ai+bj
2
)2.
(4.48)
Let (ai, bj) ∈ Ai × Bj . Let b¯i, b˜i ∈ Bi and assume, for sake of simplicity, b¯i < b˜i.
If b˜i ≤
1
2
(1 − ai+bj
2
)2, then fi(ai, b¯i, bj) < fi(ai, b˜i, bj) and D
+
1 fi(ai, b¯i, bj) > 0. If
b˜i >
1
2
(1− ai+bj
2
)2 then fi(ai, b¯i, bj) > fi(ai, b˜i, bj) and D
−
1 fi(ai, b˜i, bj) < 0, that is
fi strictly D–pseudoconcave on Bi, for each (ai, bj) ∈ Ai ×Bj .
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From (4.48), it follows that D
−
1 fi(ai, bi, bj) is quasiconcave on Bi. Instead of (AFi 11),
fi(·, bi, bj) is convex on Ai, as required in Remark 4.5.8. ⋄
Moreover, consider the case in which the payoff function of a leader de-
pends only on the strategies of the followers, that is, for i = 1, . . . , k:
(Ki) the payoff function li of Li is defined on Bi × B−i.
Furthermore, suppose that the actions sets of both leaders and followers
are subsets of R. In this simplified case, mild assumptions guaranties that
an equilibrium exists.
Theorem 4.5.11. Assume, for i = 1, . . . , k:
(ALi 11) Ai is a nonempty compact convex subset of R;
(ALi 12) li is a real–valued continuous function on Bi × B−i;
(ALi 13) li(·, b−i) is quasiconcave on Bi, for any b−i ∈ B−i;
(AFi 2) fi is a real–valued upper semicontinuous function on Ai × B;
(AFi 3) for any (ai, bi, b−i) ∈ Ai ×B, for any sequence ((ai,n, b−i,n))n con-
verging to (ai, b−i) in Ai × B−i, there exists a sequence (bˆi,n)n in Bi such
that:
lim inf
n→∞
fi(ai,n, bˆi,n, b−i,n) ≥ fi(ai, bi, b−i);
(AFi 10) Bi is a nonempty compact interval of R;
(AFi 14) fi(ai, ·, bi) is strictly D–pseudoconcave on Bi, for any (ai, b−i) ∈
Ai × B−i and Dfi(·, bi, b−i) is isotone on Ai, for all b ∈ B;
Then, there exists an equilibrium under passive beliefs of the two–stage
game Γ with vertical separation.
Proof. As in Theorem 4.5.7, assumption (Ii) on the uniqueness of values of B˜i
is not necessary. From Proposition 3.1.4 we have that the function b˜i(·, b−i)
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is nondecreasing on Ai, for any b−i ∈ B−i. Then, from Proposition 2.3.9 it
follows that b˜i, considered as a set–valued map, is quasiconvex. Thus, from
Proposition 2.3.8, we obtain that l˜i is a quasiconcave function on Bi. So, Mi
is convex–valued. Then, from Proposition 4.5.5, we have the thesis. ⋄
4.5.3 In case of nonuniqueness of the follower’s optimal
reaction
In the last part of this chapter we do not require the assumption (Ii) about
the uniqueness of solutions to followers’ parametric Optimization problems
but we consider the case in which the payoff function of any leader depends
on the action of the corresponding follower only through the optimal value
function, that is we have li(ai, b−i, vi(ai, b−i)).
So, in this section we assume for i = 1, . . . , k:
(Hi) the payoff function li of Li is defined on Ai × B−i ×R.
In this case we can extend in a natural way the characterization given in
the previous subsection when the optimal reaction B˜i defined on Ai × B−i
by B˜i(ai, b−i) = Argmaxbi∈Bi fi(ai, bi, b−i) is not single–valued.
For any i = 1, . . . , k we define the set–valued map Ei from B−i to Bi by:
Ei(b−i) = ∪ai∈Mi(b−i)B˜i(ai, b−i),
where Mi(b−i) = Argmaxai∈Ai li(ai, b−i, vi(ai, b−i)). So, with the same argu-
ments given before, an equilibrium under passive beliefs is associated to a
fixed point of the set–valued map
E =
k∏
i=1
Ei, (4.49)
and vice versa.
In the following theorem we prove an existence result using Theorem 3.2.3,
a new fixed point theorem proved in Section 3.2.
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Theorem 4.5.12. Assume, for i = 1, . . . , k:
(ALi 1) Ai is a nonempty compact convex subset of R
ni;
(ALi 14) li is a real–valued upper semicontinuous function on Ai×B−i×R;
(ALi 15) li(ai, ·, ·) is lower semicontinuous on B−i ×R, for any ai ∈ Ai;
(ALi 16) li(·, b−i, ·) is quasiconcave on Ai × R, for any b−i ∈ B−i and
li(ai, b−i, ·) is nondecreasing on R, for any (ai, b−i) ∈ Ai × B−i;
(AFi 1) Bi is a nonempty compact convex subset of R
mi;
(AFi 2) fi is a real–valued upper semicontinuous function on Ai × B;
(AFi 3) for any (ai, bi, b−i) ∈ Ai ×B, for any sequence ((ai,n, b−i,n))n con-
verging to (ai, b−i) in Ai × B−i, there exists a sequence (bˆi,n)n in Bi such
that:
lim inf
n→∞
fi(ai,n, bˆi,n, b−i,n) ≥ fi(ai, bi, b−i);
(AFi 11) fi(·, ·, b−i) is concave on Ai × B−i, for any b−i ∈ B−i;
Then, there exists an equilibrium under passive beliefs of the two–stage
game Γ with vertical separation.
Proof. From a result in Theorem 4.3.1 we have that B˜i is a closed set–valued
map and the optimal value function vi is continuous on Ai×B−i. Define the
set–valued map B˜ : A × B ⇒ B such that B˜(a, b) =
∏k
i=1 B˜i(ai, b−i). Then,
B˜ is a closed set–valued map. With the same arguments used in the proof of
Proposition 4.4.9 we obtain that the set–valued map Mi is closed. Then the
set–valued map M defined by M(b) =
∏k
i=1Mi(b−i), for any b ∈ B, is closed.
From Proposition 2.3.6, vi(·, b−i) is concave on Ai, for any b−i ∈ B−i. From
Proposition 2.1.27, it follows that l˜i(·, b−i) is quasiconcave on Ai, for any b−i ∈
B−i, for i = 1, . . . , k, that isM is convex–valued. Then, from Theorem 3.2.3,
we obtain that the set–valued map E defined in (4.49) has a fixed point on
B. Then there exists an equilibrium under passive beliefs of Γ. ⋄
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Appendix A
Basic Preliminaries
In this appendix we recall basic concepts and results on Euclidean spaces
and Real and Concave analysis that are used in this thesis. All the material
in this chapter is based mainly on Berge [6], Kelley and Namioka [36], Kelley
[35], Mangasarian [57], Bourbaki [10, 11], Klein [37], Rudin [77, 76].Cambini
and Martein [15].
A.1 The Euclidean Space Rn
Having in mind applications to economic problems, we will restrict our at-
tention to finite dimension spaces. In particular, we limit the attention to
the space Rn, where with R we indicate the set of real numbers.
The set Rn can be endowed with the addition operator +: Rn×Rn ⇒ Rn
defined by
x+ y = (x1 + y1, . . . , xn + yn).
Denoted with · the function · : R×Rn ⇒ Rn such that for any a ∈ R and
x ∈ Rn:
a·x = (a · x1, . . . , a · xn)
R
n with these two operations is a vector space (or else linear space) on R.
Let us denote with 〈·, ·〉 a function defined on Rn×Rn to R, called inner
scalar product, defined by 〈x, y〉 =
∑n
i=1 xiyi, for any x, y ∈ R
n.
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Denoted with d the real–valued function defined on Rn × Rn such that
d(x, y) = (〈x − y, x − y〉)1/2, d is called Euclidean distance. The Euclidean
distance satisfies the following properties:
(i) d(x, y) = d(y, x);
(ii) (triangle inequality) d(x, y) + d(y, z) ≥ d(x, z);
(iii) d(x, y) = 0 if and only if x = y;
for all points x, y, z ∈ Rn.
The function ‖·‖ : Rn → R defined by ‖x‖ = (〈x, x〉)1/2 = d(x, x) is called
Euclidean norm. The norm function satisfies the following properties:
(i) ‖x+ y‖ ≤ ‖x‖+ ‖y‖,
(ii) ‖a · x‖ = |a|‖x‖,
(iii) ‖x‖ = 0 if and only if x = 0,
for all x, y ∈ Rn and a ∈ R. A real coordinate space together with this
Euclidean structure is called Euclidean space.
The open ball of radius r > 0 and centered in x0 ∈ R
n is the subset of
R
n defined by:
B(x0; r) = {x ∈ R
n : d(x, x0) < r}. (A.1)
Given E ⊆ Rn and ǫ > 0, we define the set:
Uǫ(E) = ∪x∈EB(x; ǫ). (A.2)
Let E ⊆ Rn and x ∈ Rn. We denote by
d(x,E) = inf
y∈E
d(x, y) (A.3)
the distance from the point x to the set E and, also, if F ⊆ Rn we define the
distance between the two sets E and F as
d(E,F ) = inf
x∈E
d(x, F ). (A.4)
A set A ⊆ Rn is said to be open if for any x ∈ A there exists an open ball
B(x; r) centered in x such that B(x; r) ⊆ A. The sets Rn and ∅ are open
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sets. Furthermore, the union of members of an arbitrary family of open sets
is open and the intersection of a finite family of open sets is open.
A subset U of Rn is a neighborhood of a point x ∈ Rn if U contains an open
set that contains x. A set X is open if and only if it contains a neighborhood
of any of its point.
A subset C of Rn is closed if its complement Rn \C is open, where Rn \C
is the set of all elements of Rn that are not in C. The sets Rn and ∅ are
closed sets. Furthermore, the union of a finite number of closed sets is closed
an the intersection of the members of an arbitrary family of closed sets is
closed.
A point x is an accumulation point (or cluster point) of a set E ⊆ Rn if every
neighborhood of x contains points of E besides x.
A subset ofRn is closed if and only if it contains the set of its accumulation
points.
The closure of a set E ⊆ Rn, denoted with E, is the union of the set and
the set of its accumulation points. So, for any E ⊆ Rn, we have E ⊆ E and
C closed ⇔ C = C.
Equivalently, the closure of E is the intersection of the members of the family
of all closed sets containing E.
A point x of a set E ⊆ Rn is an interior point of E if E is a neighborhood
of x; the set of all the interior points of E is the interior of E and it is denoted
by int(E). So, for any E ⊆ Rn, we have E ⊇ int(E) and
A open ⇔ A = int(A).
Equivalently, the interior of E is the union of the members of the family of
all open sets contained in E.
The set of the points of E which are interior to neither E nor Rn \E are
in the boundary of E, denoted by ∂E.
A set is closed if and only if it contains its boundary; it is open if and
only if it is disjoint from its boundary.
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A sequence of points of Rn is a function x˜ : N→ Rn. Placing xn = x˜(n),
we denote the sequence with (xn)n. Let (xn)n be a sequence in R
n and N1
be a countably infinite subset of N. Then, the sequence (xn)n∈N1 is said to
be a subsequence of (xn)n.
A sequence (xn)n converges to a point x in R
n if for any neighborhood
U of x there exists a n0 ∈ N
+ such that
xn ∈ U, for any n > n0.
Equivalently, sequence (xn)n in R
n converges to a point x in X if for every
ǫ > 0 there exists a n¯ ∈ N such that, for every n ∈ N, d(xn, x) < ǫ, that is
the sequence of real numbers (d(xn, x))n converges to zero.
Any sequence (xn)n converging in R
n has a unique limit. The limit of a
convergent sequence (xn)n in R
n coincides with the limit of any subsequence
extract from (xn)n.
Convergence in the product space is called coordinatewise convergence: a se-
quence ((xn, yn))n converges to (x, y) inR
n×Rm if and only if (xn)n converges
to x in Rn and (yn)n converges to y in R
m.
Let (xn)n∈N be a sequence of real numbers. Let E be the set defined as:
E = {x ∈ R : ∃ (xn)n∈N1 , with N1 countably infinite , s. t. limn→+∞
n∈N1
xn = x}
. We define the upper limit lim supn→+∞ xn of (xn)n∈N as:
lim sup
n→+∞
xn = supE, (A.5)
where with supE we denote the supremum of E, that is x¯ = supE, if x¯ ≥ x,
for any x ∈ E, and for any ǫ > 0 there exists a x ∈ E such that x ≥ x¯− ǫ (x˜
is said to be the maximum of E, that is x˜ = maxE, if x˜ ∈ E and x˜ ≥ y, for
any y ∈ E).
In analogous way, we define the lower limit lim infn→+∞ xn of (xn)n∈N as:
lim inf
n→+∞
xn = inf E, (A.6)
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where with inf E we denote the infimum of E, that is x¯ = inf E, if x¯ ≤ y,
for any y ∈ E, and for any ǫ > 0 there exists a x ∈ E such that x ≤ x¯+ ǫ (x˜
is said to be the minimum of E, that is x˜ = minE, if x˜ ∈ E and x˜ ≤ y, for
any y ∈ E).
It can be proved that the following characterization holds:
Proposition A.1.1. Let (xn)n be a sequence of real numbers. Then x¯ is the
upper limit of (xn)n if and only if the following properties hold:
(i) for any ǫ > 0 there exists an n¯ > 0 such that xn < x¯+ ǫ for any n ≥ n¯;
(ii) for any ǫ > 0 and n ∈ N, there exists an integer k > n such that
xk > x¯− ǫ.
Analogously for the lower limit.
For every sequence of real numbers (xn)n the following properties are
satisfied:
(i) lim infn→+∞ xn ≤ lim supn→+∞ xn;
(ii) lim supn→+∞ (−xn) = − lim infn→+∞ xn;
(iii) (xn) converges if and only if:
lim inf
n→+∞
xn = lim sup
n→+∞
xn = lim
n→+∞
xn;
(iv) if (yn) is a sequence of real numbers we have:
lim sup
n→+∞
(xn + yn) ≤ lim sup
n→+∞
xn + lim sup
n→+∞
yn
lim inf
n→+∞
(xn + yn) ≥ lim inf
n→+∞
xn + lim inf
n→+∞
xn.
If E ⊆ Rn, a point x is an accumulation point for E if and only if there
exists a sequence (xn)n of points in E converging to x. Then, a subset C of
X is closed if and only if the limit of any converging sequence (xn) of points
of C is in C; that is if (xn)n is a sequence in C that converges to x then
x ∈ C.
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A subsetK of Rn is compact if any cover by open set has a finite subcover,
that is, for every arbitrary collection of open sets (Ui)i∈I such that K ⊆
∪i∈IUi, there exists a finite set J ⊆ I such that K ⊆ ∪j∈JUj.
If K is compact, then it can be shown that every infinite subset of K has
an accumulation point.
Let K be a compact subset of Rn and C a closed subset of K. Then C
is compact.
A set K is sequentially compact if any sequence of points in K has a
subsequence which converges to a point in K.
In Rn the notions of compactness and sequential compactness are equiv-
alent.
The product of compact subsets of Euclidean spaces is compact sets.
A subset X of Rn is said to be bounded if there exists a r > 0 and x ∈ Rn
such that X ⊆ B(x; r).
A subset X of Rn is a compact set if it is a closed and bounded set.
A.2 On Continuous and Semicontinuous Func-
tions
Let X and Y be subset of Rn and Rm, respectively. Then a function f
from X to Y (f : X → Y ) is continuous at a point x of X if the inverse
image of any neighborhood of f(x) is a neighborhood of x. The function f
is continuous if f is continuous at any point x in X, or, equivalently, if and
only if the inverse of any open subset A of Y is a open subset of X, that is
if f−1(A) = {x ∈ X : f(x) ∈ A} is open.
Equivalently, the continuity property can be stated in sequential terms.
Proposition A.2.1. Let X and Y be subsets of Rn and Rm, respectively. A
function f : X → Y is continuous at x ∈ X if for any sequence (xn)n in X
converging to x, the sequence (f(xn))n converges to f(x) in Y .
Let X and Y be subsets of Rn and Rm, respectively, and f be a function
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defined on the product space X × Y to Z ⊆ Rr. Then f is continuous at x
(resp. y) if for any y ∈ Y (resp. x ∈ X) the function f(·, y) (resp. f(x, ·)),
whose value at x (resp. y) is f(x, y) , is continuous at x (resp. y). If f is
continuous on the product space, then f is continuous both in x and y, but
the converse is no longer true. For example, consider the function f defined
on R2 such that f(x, y) = xy
x2+y2
for any (x, y) 6= (0, 0) and f(0, 0) = 0.
The graph of a function f : X → Y is the subset of X × Y of all pairs
(x, f(x)) such that x ∈ X:
Graph f = {(x, y) ∈ X × Y : y = f(x)}.
Let X and Y be subsets of Rn and Rm, respectively, and f : X → Y
be continuous. Then, Graph f is a closed subset of Rn × Rm. The vice
versa is not always true. For example consider the function defined on R by
f(x) =


1
x
, if x 6= 0,
0, otherwise.
Let us report a result on continuous functions that will be used in Chap-
ter 4.
Theorem A.2.2 (Brouwer Fixed Point Theorem). Let f be a continuous
function from a nonempty compact convex set X ⊆ Rn to itself. Then f has
a fixed point, that there exists a point x∗ ∈ X such that x∗ = f(x∗).
A function f from X ⊆ Rm to R is also said to be a real–valued function.
A function f from X ⊆ Rm to R, where R = R ∪ {−∞} ∪ {+∞}, is said to
be an extended real–valued function.
The Euclidean norm, the Euclidean distance and the inner scalar product
are real–valued continuous functions.
A real–valued function f is continuous at x ∈ X if and only if the two
conditions holds:
(i) for any ǫ > 0 there exists a δ > 0 such that for all y ∈ X such that
d(x, y) < δ we have f(x)− f(y) < ǫ;
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(ii) for any ǫ > 0 there exists a δ > 0 such that for all y ∈ X such that
d(x, y) < δ we have f(x)− f(y) > −ǫ;
Requiring only one of the above conditions at a time we obtain two con-
cepts weaker than continuity that are called in literature lower and upper
semicontinuity.
More precisely:
Definition A.2.3
A real–valued function f defined on X ⊆ Rn is upper semicontinuous at
x ∈ X if for any ǫ > 0 there exists a δ > 0 such that, for any y ∈ X such that
d(x, y) < δ we have f(x)− f(y) < ǫ. The function f is upper semicontinuous
if f is upper semicontinuous at every point of X.
A real–valued function g defined on X ⊆ Rn is lower semicontinuous at
x ∈ X if −g is upper semicontinuous at x, that is if for any ǫ > 0 there exists
a δ > 0 such that, for any y ∈ X such that d(x, y) < δ we have f(x)−f(y) >
−ǫ; g is lower semicontinuous in X if −g is upper semicontinuous.
So, a function f is continuous if and only if it is upper and lower semi-
continuous.
The notion of semicontinuity can be formulated in a sequential way, using
the upper and the lower limit.
Figure A.1: A lower
semi–continuous
function on R
Figure A.2: An up-
per semi–continuous
function on R
Figure A.3: A neither
upper nor lower semi–
continuous function
on R
102
A.2 On Continuous and Semicontinuous Functions
Figure A.4: f(x) =
{
x if x 6= 1
1/2 if x = 1
is a lower semi–continuous function
on R
Figure A.5: f(x) =
{
x2 if x 6= 0
1/2 if x = 0
is a upper semi–continuous function
on R
Proposition A.2.4. A real–valued function f defined on X ⊆ Rn is upper
semicontinuous (resp. lower semicontinuous) at x if for any sequence (xn)n
in X converging to x in X, we have:
lim sup
n→+∞
f(xn) ≤ f(x)(
resp. lim inf
n→+∞
f(xn) ≥ f(x)
)
.
Let f be a real–valued function defined on X ⊆ R. Then, f is bounded
from below (resp. bounded from above) if there exists a number α such that
f(x) ≥ α (resp. f(x) ≤ α) for any x ∈ X. The number α is said to be an
upper bound (resp. lower bound) of f on X.
If there exists a lower bound (resp. upper bound) α¯ of f on X such that
for any ǫ > 0 there exists an element x ∈ X such that f(x) ≤ α¯ + ǫ (resp.
f(x) ≥ α¯− ǫ), then α¯ is said to be the infimum (resp. supremum) of f on X
and we write α¯ = infx∈X f(x) (resp. α¯ = supx∈X f(x)). If the function f is
not bounded from below (resp. from above) then infx∈X f(x) = −∞ (resp.
supx∈X f(x) = +∞).
Let f be a real–valued function defined on X ⊆ Rn. If there exists an
x¯ ∈ X such that f(x¯) ≤ f(x) (resp. f(x¯) ≥ f(x)), for any x ∈ X then x¯ is
said to be a global minimum point (resp. global maximum point) of f on X
103
A. Basic Preliminaries
and f(x¯) is said to be the minimum value, or else for short minimum, (resp.
maximum value) of f on X. We write:
f(x¯) = min
x∈X
f(x) (resp. f(x¯) = max
x∈X
f(x)) (A.7)
and
x¯ ∈ Argmin
x∈X
f(x) (resp. x¯ ∈ Argmax
x∈X
f(x)). (A.8)
Let us emphasize that not every real–valued function has a minimum
(resp. maximum) point. Moreover, a minimum (resp. maximum) value, if
it exists, must be finite and coincide with the infimum (resp. supremum) of
the function.
Furthermore, a point x¯ ∈ X is said to be a local minimum point (resp.
local maximum point) for f on X if there exists a open ball B(x¯; r) such that
f(x¯) ≤ f(x) (resp. f(x¯) ≥ f(x)), for any x ∈ B(x¯; r) ∩X.
A global minimum point is also a local one, the vice versa is not true.
Semicontinuous functions are useful in optimization for the existence of
a minimum and a maximum value. That is:
Theorem A.2.5 (Generalized Weierstrass Theorem). A lower (resp. upper)
semicontinuous function f defined on a nonempty compact set X ⊆ Rn has
a minimum (resp. maximum); that is, there exists x¯ ∈ X such that, for any
x ∈ X, f(x¯) ≤ f(x) (resp. f(x¯) ≥ f(x)).
Differentiable real–valued functions
Let f be a real–valued function defined on an open set X ⊆ Rn. The i–th
partial derivative at x¯ ∈ X is:
∂f
xi
(x¯) = lim
t→+∞
f(x¯+ tei)− f(x¯)
t
if the limit exists, where ei is the n–tuple that has all components equal
to zero, except the i–th that is equal to 1. Assuming that all the partial
derivatives exist at x ∈ X, then the gradient of f at x¯ is the n-tuple ∇f(x¯) =(
∂f
x1
(x¯), . . . , ∂f
xn
(x¯)
)
.
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The function f is said to be differentiable at x¯ ∈ X if there exists a linear
function A : X → R such that
lim
h→o
h∈Rn
‖f(x¯+ h)− f(x¯) + A(h)‖
‖h‖
= 0
A function f is differentiable on X if it is differentiable at x, for any x ∈ X.
A.3 On Concave Functions
Convexity and concavity of a function play an important role in economic
problems, in particular in problems that are formulated in terms of optimiza-
tion tools.
Definition A.3.1
A subset X of Rn is said to be convex if λx + (1− λ)y ∈ X, for any x, y in
X and for any λ ∈ [0, 1]; that is the closed line segment joining two points
of X is included in X.
Definition A.3.2
Let X be a convex subset of Rn. A real–valued function (resp. extended
real–valued function) f defined on X is said to be concave if for any x, y in
X (resp. x, y ∈ X such that f(x) > −∞, f(y) > −∞) and any λ ∈ [0, 1]
f(λx+ (1− λ)y) ≥ λf(x) + (1− λ)f(y). (A.9)
A real–valued function (resp. extended real–valued function) f defined on X
is said to be strictly concave if for any x, y in X (resp. x, y ∈ X such that
f(x) > −∞, f(y) > −∞) with x 6= y and any λ ∈]0, 1[
f(λx+ (1− λ)y) > λf(x) + (1− λ)f(y). (A.10)
(A.11)
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A real–valued function f , defined on X, is convex (resp. strictly convex ) in
S if −f is concave (resp. strictly concave) in S.
An extended real–valued function f , defined on X, is convex (resp. strictly
convex ) in S if −f is concave (resp. strictly concave) in S.
Definition A.3.3
A real–valued function f : X ⊆ Rn → R such that f(x) = 〈a, x〉 + α, where
a ∈ Rn and α ∈ R, is a linear affine function. It is both convex and concave.
Let us summarize some properties.
Proposition A.3.4. Let f be a real–valued function defined on a convex set
X ⊆ Rn. Then, the following results hold:
(i) If f is concave then every local maximum point for f on X is a global
maximum point of f on X.
(ii) If f is concave then the set Argmaxx∈X f(x) = {x¯ ∈ X : f(x¯) =
maxx∈X f(x)} is convex.
(iii) Let x¯ be a global maximum point of f on X. If f is strictly concave,
then x¯ is the unique global maximum point.
(iv) f is concave (resp. convex) if and only if the hypograph
hyp(f) = {(x, y) ∈ X × Y ×R : f(x) ≥ y} (A.12)
(resp. epigraph epi(f) = {(x, y) ∈ X × Y ×R : f(x) ≤ y}) is a convex
subset of Rn+1.
(v) f is concave if and only if for any x1, x2 ∈ X the function φ(t) =
f(tx1 + (1− t)x2) is concave on the segment [0, 1].
(vi) If X is open and f is concave on X, then f is continuous on X.
(vii) If f is a concave function and λ ≥ 0, then the function λf is also a
concave function. If f1 and f2 are concave functions defined on X, then
the function f1 + f2 is also concave.
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(viii) Let (fi)i∈I be a collection of concave functions defined on X, with I
finite or infinite. Let
f˜(x) = inf
i∈I
fi(x)
for any x ∈ X. Then, the function f˜ is concave on X.
X
Figure A.6: The hypograph of a con-
cave function
Λα
α
Figure A.7: The upper level set Λα
of a concave function
Corollary A.3.5. If f is concave on a convex set X ⊆ Rn, then, the set
Λα = {x ∈ R
n : f(x) ≥ α} called upper level set at height α (or else upper
contour set at height α) is convex, for any real number α.
If f is convex on X, then, the set Γα = {z ∈ R
n : f(x) ≤ α} called lower
level set at height α (or else lower contour set at height α) is convex, for
any real number α.
The last corollary give a necessary, but not sufficient condition for con-
cavity, as we see in Figure A.8, in which is represented the graph of a concave
function with convex lower level sets.
A differentiable function satisfies the following property:
Proposition A.3.6. Let f be a differentiable real–valued function defined on
an open convex set X ⊆ Rn. Then f is concave on X if and only if
f(x2)− f(x1) ≤ 〈∇f(x1), x2 − x1〉 for any x1, x2 ∈ X. (A.13)
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α
Λα
Figure A.8: Each lower contour set of f is convex but f is not a convex
function
f is strictly concave if and only if the inequality in A.13 is strict for x1 6= x2.
As pointed out in [57], the above proposition can be interpreted geo-
metrically saying that for a differentiable concave function the linearization
f(x¯) + 〈∇f(x¯)(x− x¯)〉 at x¯ never underestimates f(x) for any x ∈ X.
Proposition A.3.7. Let f be a real–valued differentiable function on an
open convex set X ⊆ Rn. Then f is concave on X if and only if for any
x1, x2 ∈ X we have
〈∇f(x2)−∇f(x1), x2 − x1〉 ≤ 0; (A.14)
that is the operator ∇f is monotone on X, where a n-dimensional function g
defined on X ⊆ Rn is said to be monotone on X if 〈g(x2)−g(x1), x2−x1)〉 ≤ 0
for all x1, x2 ∈ X. f is strictly concave if and only if the inequality in A.14
is strict for x1 6= x2.
Finally, the following theorem states that for a concave function the first–
order necessary conditions for optimality are also sufficient:
Theorem A.3.8. Let f a differentiable concave function defined on a convex
set X ⊆ R. If ∇f(x∗) = 0 at a point x∗ ∈ X, then x∗ is a global maximum
point of f on X.
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